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NaNotechNology has beeN described as a traNsformative techNology that will bring about 
the next industrial revolution. Over the last few decades, scientists and their research partners have acquired 
nanotechnology patents in a manner resembling a gold rush. The nanotechnology gold rush has specifically 
targeted nanomaterials, nanotechnology’s building blocks. Many of the patents that have been granted for 
nanomaterials are broad, general patents encompassing basic research. A driving force behind the patenting 
of basic research in nanotechnology was the development-oriented approach to patent rights. This approach 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, and supported the widespread patenting of basic research in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Development-oriented theorists argued that the most efficient way to achieve the development 
and commercialization of research is to grant broad patents on research prospects shortly after their 
discovery. Beginning in 1998 with the publication of Michael A. Heller’s “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” 
the beliefs held by development-oriented theorists have been challenged by proponents of “anticommons 
theory.” In particular, anticommons theorists questioned whether granting broad patents on research 
prospects necessarily leads to the efficient development of research. Anticommons theorists argued that this 
assumption fails to take into account the possibility that granting patents on research prospects could stifle 
development through the phenomenon of the tragedy of the anticommons. This article will examine the 
contemporary nanotechnology patent landscape in the United States of America to determine whether the 
broad patenting of nanomaterials has led to the creation of an anticommons. It will also examine whether 
this anticommons is likely to turn tragic, stifling innovation in nanotechnology. This article proposes the 
adoption of a strict utility requirement as a solution to the problems posed by the tragedy of the 
anticommons in nanotechnology in the US.
la NaNotechNologie a été qualifiée de techNologie traNsformative apte à provoquer la 
prochaine révolution industrielle. Au cours des dernières décennies, les scientifiques et leurs partenaires de 
recherche ont acquis des brevets de nanotechnologie et ce, d’une manière qui s’apparente fort à une ruée 
vers l’or. La ruée vers l’or de la nanotechnologie a ciblé en particulier des nanomatériaux, qui sont les 
véritables composantes de la nanotechnologie. Bon nombre des brevets accordés à l’égard de nanomatériaux 
sont de vaste portée. Rappelons que les brevets de nature générale comprennent de la recherche 
fondamentale. La force motrice qui sous-tend le brevetage de la recherche fondamentale de la 
nanotechnologie a été l’approche axée sur le développement envers les droits attachés au brevet. Cette 
approche a vu le jour dans les années 1960 et 1970, et fut à la base de la vague de brevetage de la recherche 
fondamentale dans les années 1980 et 1990. Selon les théoriciens axés sur le développement, la manière la 
plus efficace d’assurer le développement et la commercialisation de la recherche consiste à accorder des 
brevets d’application générale sur des projets de recherche peu après leur découverte. Au début de 1998, 
avec la publication de « The Tragedy of the Anticommons » de Michael A. Heller, les croyances théoriciens 
axés sur le développement ont été remises en question par les adeptes de la « théorie des anticommuns ». 
Les théoriciens partisans des anticommuns se sont en particulier demandé dans quelle mesure l’octroi de 
brevets de portée générale à l’égard de perspectives de recherche mène forcément à un développement 
concret de la recherche. Selon les théoriciens partisans des anticommuns, cette hypothèse ne tient pas 
compte de la possibilité que l’octroi de brevets sur des perspectives de recherche puisse réprimer le 
développement en raison du phénomène de la tragédie des anticommuns. Dans cet article, on examine le 
paysage actuel du brevetage de la nanotechnologie aux États-Unis afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure le 
brevetage général des nanomatériaux aurait entraîné la création d’un anticommun. On se demande 
également si cet anticommun pourrait entraîner une innovation étouffante et tragique en matière de 
nanotechnologie. Selon cet article, l’adoption d’une exigence de stricte utilité permettrait de résoudre les 
problèmes posés par la tragédie des anticommuns en matière de nanotechnologie aux États-Unis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Encompassing “nEarly EvEry disciplinE	 of	 science	 and	 engineering,”1	
nanotechnology	 has	 been	 described	 as	 a	 transformative	 technology	 that	 will	
bring	 about	 	 “the	 next	 industrial	 revolution.”2	 Nanotechnology	 is	 broadly	
characterized	as	the	construction	and	application	of	materials	and	structures	at	
the	nanometer	scale	(1	nanometer	=	1	billionth	of	a	meter),	where	properties	of	
matter	 differ	 significantly	 from	 those	 at	 a	 larger	 scale.3	 Nanotechnology	 is	
projected	to	have	a	global	market	value	of	USA$1	trillion	by	2010.4	In	addition	
to	being	lucrative,	some	believe	that	nanotechnology	can	help	solve	many	of	the	
problems	 facing	 the	world	 today.	Nanotechnology	 has	 been	 said	 to	 have	 the	
ability	 to	 repair	 damage	 caused	 to	 the	 environment,	 create	 new	 and	 virtually	
boundless	 fresh	 water	 resources,	 and	 cure	 various	 diseases,	 among	 other	
astonishing	possibilities.5	
Over	 the	 last	 few	decades,	 scientists and	 their	 research	partners	have	
��� Massimiliano�di�Ventra,�Stephane�Evoy�and�James�R�Heflin�Jr�,�eds,�Introduction to Nanoscale Science and 
Technology (Kluwer,��2004)��at�p���
2�� Liming�Dal,�“From�Conventional�Technology�to�Carbon�Nanotechnology:�The�Fourth�Industrial�Revolution�
and�the�Discoveries�of�C60,�Carbon�Nanotube�and�Nanodiamond,”�in�Liming�Dal,�ed�,�Carbon 
Nanotechnology (Elsevier,�2006)�at�p��3;�Joachim�Schummer�and�Davis�Baird,�eds�,�Nanotechnology 
Challenges: Implications for Philosophy, Ethics and Society�(World�Scientific,��2006)�at�p��;�J�Storrs�Hall,�
Nanofuture: What’s Next for Nanotechnology (Prometheus�Books,�2005)�at�p��9�
3�� Royal�Society�and�the�Royal�Academy�of�Engineering,�“Nanoscience�and�Nanotechnologies:�Opportunities�
and�Uncertainties,”�(July�2004),�<http://www�nanotec�org�uk/finalReport�htm>�at�p��5��
4�� RNCOS,�The World Nanotechnology Market�(October�2005),�<http://www�researchandmarkets�com/
reportinfo�asp?report_id=30750>�
5�� UNCTAD,�“Interactive�Dialogue�on�Harnessing�Emerging�Technologies�to�Meet�the�Millennium�
Development�Goals,”�(4�June�2004),�<http://stdev�unctad�org/unsystem/emerging�htm>,�cited�in�Donald�
C�MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�Countries,�Part�:�What�Possibilities?”�AZojono Journal of  
Nanotechnology Online�(2004),�<http://www�azonano�com/Details�asp?ArticleID=428>;�Fabio�Salamanca-
Buentello,�Deepa�L�Persad,�Erin�B�Court,�Douglas�K�Martin,�Abdallah�S�Daar�and�Peter�A�Singer,�
“Nanotechnology�and�the�Developing�World,”�(2005)�2:5�PLOS Medicine�e97,�<http://medicine�
plosjournals�org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=0�37/journal�pmed�0020097>��
82  university of ottawa	law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
acquired	nanotechnology	patents6	in	a	manner	resembling	a	“gold	rush.”7		The	
nanotechnology	gold	rush	has	specifically	targeted	nanomaterials.8	Referred	to	as	
nanotechnology’s	“building	blocks,”	nanomaterials	are	the	foundation	of	future	
development	in	nanotechnology.9	Many	of	the	patents	that	have	been	granted	
for	nanomaterials	are	broad,	general	patents	that	encompass	basic	research.	
Nanotechnology	is	the	first	modern	technology	to	have	its	basic	research	
patented.10	 The	 basic	 research	 of	 most	 other	 twentieth-century	 technologies,	
including	the	computer,	software,	the	internet,	and	biotechnology,	has	generally	
remained	 in	 the	public	domain.11	A	driving	 force	behind	 the	patenting	of	basic	
research	 in	 nanotechnology	was	 the	 development-oriented	 approach	 to	 patent	
rights,	which	emerged	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.	The	most	prominent	account	of	the	
development-oriented	approach	 is	Edmund	Kitch’s	“prospect	theory.”12	 Inspired	
by	the	principle	of	the	tragedy	of	the	commons13	and	based	on	the	hypothetical	
Coasean	world	with	zero	transaction	costs,14	Kitch	argued	that	the	most	efficient	
way	 to	 achieve	 the	development	 and	 commercialization	of	 research	 is	 to	grant	
broad	patents	on	research	prospects	shortly	after	their	discovery.15	
Development-oriented	 arguments	 supported	 the	widespread	patenting	
of	basic	research	in	the	1980s	and	1990s.16	First,	development-oriented	arguments	
played	a	role	in	the	passage	of	the	Bayh-Dole	Act	in	1980,	a	technology	transfer	
statute	that	encouraged	scientists	to	patent	the	results	of	federally	funded	research.17	
Scientists	responded	to	the	incentives	provided	by	the	Bayh-Dole	Act	by	increasing	
their	efforts	to	seek	patents.18	Second,	development-oriented	arguments	played	a	
role	in	the	creation	of	the	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Federal	Circuit	(CAFC)	in	1982,	
a	unified	court	of	patent	appeals.	Decisions	of	the	CAFC	weakening	various	patent	
requirements	led	to	increased	patenting	of	basic	research.19	
6�� A�patent�can�be�defined�as�a�public�document�that�gives�the�patentee�exclusive�rights�to�the�use�of�the�
invention�as�defined�in�the�patent�claims�
7�� Lux�Research,�Inc�,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush�Yields�Crowded,�Entangled�Patents”�(2�April�2005),�
<http://www�luxresearchinc�com/press/RELEASE_IPreport�pdf>��
8�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7�
9�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7;�Nicholas�A�Kotov,�ed,�Nanoparticle Assemblies 
and Superstructures�(Taylor�&�Francis,�2006)�at�preface;�Ventra,�Evoy�and�Heflin�Jr�,�Introduction to 
Nanoscale Science and Technology,�supra note��at�p��2;�John�C�Miller,�Ruben�Serrato,�Jose�Miguel�
Represas-Cardenas,�Griffith�Kundahl,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology: Business, Policy and Intellectual 
Property Law�(Wiley,�2005)�at�p��5�
0�� Mark�A�Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�(2005)�58�Stanford Law Review�60–630,�<http://lawreview�
stanford�edu/content/vol58/issue2/lemley�pdf�>�at�pp��60,�605��
�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”supra note�0�at�p��63��Nanotechnology�is�the�first�technology�to�
have�its�basic�ideas�and�building�blocks�patented�since�the�airplane�industry�and�radio�industry�
experienced�“debilitating�patent�battles”�in�the�early�twentieth�century���Lemley,�“Patenting�
Nanotechnology,”supra note�0�at�pp��605–606�
2�� Arti�Kaur�Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research:�Intellectual�Property�Rights�and�the�Norms�of�Science,”�(999)�
94:�Northwestern University Law Review�77–52,�<http://eprints�law�duke�edu/45//94_Nw�_U�_L�_
Rev�_77_(999-2000)�pdf>�at�pp��77,�20;�Edmund�W�Kitch,�“The�Nature�and�Function�of�the�Patent�
System,”�(977)�20�The Journal of Law & Economics�265–290,���at�p��265�
3�� Dan�L�Burk�and�Mark�A�Lemley,�“Policy�Levers�in�Patent�Law,”�(2003)�89�Virginia Law Review�575–696,�
<http://papers�ssrn�com/sol3/papers�cfm?abstract_id=43360>�at�pp��575–600�
4�� Burk�and�Lemley,�“Policy�Levers�in�Patent�Law,”�supra�note�3�at�p��600�
5�� Kitch,�“The�Nature�and�Function�of�the�Patent�System,”�supra�note�2�at�p��266�
6�� Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research,”�supra note�2�
7�� Bayh-Dole Act, (980)�35�United States Code, ch�8,�ss��200–22,�<http://www4�law�cornell�edu/uscode/35/
usc_sup_0_35_0_II_20_8�html>�
8�� Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research,”�supra note�2�at�p��09�
9�� Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research,”�supra note�2�at�p��20���For�instance,�the�CAFC�weakened�the�utility�
requirement�in�In re Brana�(USA�Fed�Cir,�995),�<http://bulk�resource�org/courts�gov/c/F3/5/5�
F3d�560�93-393�html>,�63�United States Law Week�2656��In�the�same�year,�it�weakened�the�
nonobviousness�standard�in�In re Deuel (USA�Fed�Cir,�995)�5�Federal Reporter, 3d Ser.�552�
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In	 recent	 years,	 the	 beliefs	 held	 by	 development-oriented	 theorists	
have	been	challenged	by	proponents	of	“anticommons	theory.”20	 In	particular,	
anticommons	theorists	questioned	whether	granting	broad	patents	on	research	
prospects	necessarily	leads	to	the	efficient	development	and	commercialization	
of	research.21	Anticommons	theorists	argued	that	this	assumption	fails	to	take	into	
account	the	possibility	that	granting	broad	patents	on	research	prospects	could	
stifle	development	through	the	phenomenon	of	the	tragedy	of	the	anticommons.	
The	seminal	account	of	“anticommons	theory”	is	Michael	A	Heller’s	“The	
Tragedy	of	the	Anticommons.”22	Heller	and	Rebecca	Eisenberg	are	the	two	most	
prominent	 anticommons	 theorists.	 They	 state	 that	 anticommons	 property	 can	
be	 seen	as	 the	“mirror	 image”	of	 commons	property.23	 In	 commons	property,	
multiple	individuals	have	privileges	of	use	in	a	scarce	resource,	and	no	one	can	
exclude	another.24	As	a	result,	 the	resource	 is	prone	to	overexploitation.25	This	
overexploitation	is	described	as	the	“tragedy	of	the	commons.”	The	tragedy	of	
the	commons	is	resolved	by	granting	rights	of	exclusion	in	the	scarce	resource.	
Conversely,	 anticommons	 property	 is	 created	where	 too	many	 individuals	 are	
endowed	 with	 rights	 of	 exclusion	 in	 a	 scarce	 resource.26	 In	 this	 situation,	 no	
one	has	a	privilege	of	use.27	The	“tragedy”	of	 the	anticommons	occurs	where	
individuals	are	unable	to	bundle	the	exclusionary	rights	 in	the	scarce	resource,	
causing	the	resource	to	be	underused.	
Kitch	 advocated	 for	 the	 broad	 patenting	 of	 research	 prospects	 as	 a	
response	to	what	he	viewed	as	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	in	scientific	research.	
This	article	will	examine	whether,	in	the	context	of	nanotechnology,	the	attempt	
to	overcome	one	tragedy	has	led	to	the	creation	of	another.	An	analysis	of	the	
US	nanotechnology	patent	 landscape	suggests	that	an	anticommons	has	been	
created	in	nanomaterials.	Patent	rights	in	nanomaterials	are	broad,	overlapping,	
and	 fragmented.28	 Before	 one	 can	 use	 a	 nanomaterial,	 one	must	 first	 acquire	
licenses	 for	 all	 of	 the	 fragmented	 and	 overlapping	 nanomaterial	 patents.	 A	
“tragedy”	of	the	anticommons	will	occur	if	individuals	are	unable	to	bundle	the	
patent	rights.	If	the	nanotechnology	anticommons	turns	tragic,	nanomaterials	will	
be	underutilized	and	nanotechnology	innovation	will	suffer.
The	nanotechnology	anticommons	will	not	necessarily	become	tragic.	The	
tragedy	of	the	anticommons	will	be	prevented	if	the	fragmented	and	overlapping	
patent	rights	in	nanomaterials	can	be	assembled	into	useful	bundles.	There	are	
two	main	ways	to	bundle	the	multiple	exclusionary	rights	in	nanomaterials.	The	first	
occurs	through	informal	market	mechanisms,	such	as	cross-licensing	agreements	
or	patent	pools.	 The	 success	of	 informal	market	mechanisms	depends	on	 the	
20�� Michael�A�Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons:�Property�in�the�Transition�from�Marx�to�Markets,”�
(998)��Harvard Law Review 62–688,�<http://papers�ssrn�com/sol3/papers�cfm?abstract_id=57627>�
at�p��62;�Michael�A�Heller�and�Rebecca�S�Eisenberg,�“Can�Patents�Deter�Innovation?�The�Anticommons�in�
Biomedical�Research”�(�May�998)�280�Science�698–70,�<http://www�sciencemag�org/cgi/
reprint/280/5364/698�pdf>�at�p��698�
2�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20;�Heller�and�Eisenberg,�“Can�Patents�Deter�
Innovation?”�supra�note�20�
22�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�
23�� Heller�and�Eisenberg,�“Can�Patents�Deter�Innovation?”�supra�note�20�at�p��698���
24�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��624�
25�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��624�
26�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��624�
27�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��624�
28�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7�
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ability	of	the	parties	involved	to	licence	their	patents	effectively.	Development-
oriented	 theory	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 Coasean	 assumption	 of	 zero	 transaction	
costs.29	In	the	case	of	nanotechnology,	however,	transaction	costs	and	strategic	
behaviour	will	likely	prove	to	be	substantial	impediments	to	the	achievement	of	
informal	licensing	agreements.	
The	 second	way	 to	assemble	 the	 fragmented	and	overlapping	patent	
rights	in	nanomaterials	into	useful	bundles	is	through	non-market	action,	namely	
through	 legislative	 or	 judicial	 redefinition	 of	 rights.	 This	 article	 proposes	 the	
adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	as	a	solution	to	the	problems	posed	by	
the	tragedy	of	the	anticommons	in	nanotechnology.	The	utility	requirement	is	an	
essential	element	of	patentability.	It	stipulates	that	inventions	cannot	be	patented	
unless	 they	 are	 “useful.”	 In	 the	 US,	 the	 utility	 requirement,	 in	 the	 context	 of	
scientific	research,	has	fluctuated	between	a	weak	and	a	strict	standard.
The	 adoption	 of	 a	 strict	 utility	 requirement	 is	 particularly	 suited	 as	 a	
solution	 to	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anticommons	 in	 nanotechnology.	Many	 of	 the	
patents	making	up	the	nanotechnology	anticommons	encompass	basic	research	
and	were	granted	on	the	basis	of	a	weak	utility	requirement.	Most	of	these	claims	
would	not	satisfy	a	strict	utility	requirement.	As	a	result,	the	adoption	of	a	strict	
utility	requirement	would	invalidate	a	substantial	number	of	broad,	overlapping	
patents	on	nanomaterials.	
This	solution	will	not	eradicate	the	anticommons.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	many	
patents	would	be	able	to	satisfy	the	strict	utility	standard	while	still	having	sufficient	
breadth	to	be	considered	part	of	the	nanotechnology	anticommons.	The	removal	
of	multiple	exclusionary	rights	from	the	nanotechnology	anticommons,	however,	
makes	it	more	likely	that	users	will	be	able	to	bundle	the	remaining	nanomaterial	
patents	 through	 informal	 licensing	 agreements.	 Thus,	 the	 nanotechnology	
anticommons	is	less	likely	to	turn	tragic.	
My	 analysis	 is	 divided	 into	 seven	 parts.	 Part	 2	 will	 introduce	
nanotechnology	 and	 nanomaterials.	 Part	 3	 will	 discuss	 the	 patenting	 of	 basic	
scientific	research	in	the	US.	It	will	introduce	the	development-oriented	approach	
and	discuss	 its	 influence	on	US	patent	 law.	Part	4	will	 introduce	anticommons	
theory.	 It	 will	 also	 explain	 why	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 critique	 the	 development-
oriented	approach	using	anticommons	theory.	Part	5	will	suggest	the	existence	of	
an	anticommons	in	nanomaterials	in	the	US.	Part	6	will	explore	market	solutions	to	
the	nanotechnology	anticommons.	It	will	discuss	why	informal	market	mechanisms	
will	likely	fail	to	overcome	the	nanotechnology	anticommons.	Part	7	will	explore	
various	non-market	solutions	to	the	problems	posed	by	the	US	nanotechnology	
anticommons.	I	propose	the	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	as	a	solution	
to	the	problems	posed	by	the	tragedy	of	the	anticommons	in	nanotechnology.	
This	 article	 will	 address	 the	 nanotechnology	 anticommons	 in	 the	
US.	 The	 US	 leads	 the	 world	 in	 both	 government	 and	 corporate	 spending	 in	
nanotechnology,	 in	publications	on	nanoscale	 science	 and	engineering	 topics,	
and	in	nanotechnology	patents.30	The	race	to	patent	nanotechnology	inventions	
is	 occurring	 worldwide.	 As	 a	 result,	 nanotechnology	 anticommons	 may	 have	
29�� Burk�and�Lemley,�“Policy�Levers�in�Patent�Law,”�supra�note�3�at�p��600�
30�� Lux�Research�Inc�,�“Top�Nations�in�Nanotech�See�Their�Lead�Erode,”�(8�March�2007),�
<http://www�luxresearchinc�com/press/RELEASE_NationsRanking2007�pdf>�
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developed	in	countries	other	than	the	US.	However,	given	the	position	of	the	US	
as	the	world’s	leader	in	nanotechnology,	the	elimination	of	the	nanotechnology	
anticommons	 in	 the	 US	 will	 go	 a	 long	 way	 towards	 ensuring	 that,	 globally,	
nanotechnology’s	potential	will	not	be	stifled	due	to	excessive	transaction	and	
strategic	costs.
*
2. OVERVIEW OF NANOTECHNOLOGY
This parT will firsT dEfinE nanoTEchnology	 and	 nanomaterials.	 Second,	 it	
will	 describe	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 nanotechnology.	 Third,	 it	 will	
comment	on	nanotechnology’s	potential.	Fourth,	it	will	describe	how	a	significant	
number	 of	 the	 patents	 that	 have	 been	 granted	 for	 nanomaterials	 encompass	
basic	scientific	research.
2.1. Definitions
2.1.1.	Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology	 is	broadly	characterized	as	 the	construction	and	application	
of	materials	and	structures	at	the	nanometer	scale,	where	properties	of	matter	
differ	significantly	 from	those	at	a	 larger	scale.31	The	field	of	nanotechnology	
is	 defined	 primarily	 by	 a	 unit	 of	 length,	 the	 nanometer.32	 One	 nanometer,	
which	spans	approximately	10	atoms,33	is	equivalent	to	one	billionth	of	a	meter	
(1	nm	=	1x10 9� m).34	To	put	this	size	in	context,	a	human	hair	has	a	thickness	
of	 approximately	 80,000	 nanometers,	 a	 DNA	molecule	 is	 approximately	 2.5	
nanometers	wide,	and	the	diameter	of	a	red	blood	cell	is	approximately	5,000	
nanometers.35
Two	aspects	of	working	at	the	nanometer	scale	afford	the	main	drive	for	
investment	 in	 nanotechnology.36	 	 First,	 progressing	 from	 the	 micrometer	 scale	
to	the	nanometer	scale	allows	one	to	pursue	the	“miniaturization	of	current	and	
new	 instruments,	 sensors	 and	 machines.”37	 This	 miniaturization	 permits	 “more	
functionality	in	a	given	space.”38	Furthermore,	manufacturing	advantages	can	flow	
from	“increases	in	a	material’s	surface	area	and	surface-to-volume	ratio.”39	These	
increases	are	inherent	in	any	progression	from	the	micrometer	to	nanometer	scale.40
Second,	while	materials	at	the	micrometer	scale	generally	exhibit	the	same	
physical	properties	as	materials	in	macro	form,	materials	at	the	nanometer	scale	
3�� Royal�Society�and�the�Royal�Academy�of�Engineering,�“Nanoscience�and�Nanotechnologies,”�supra�note�3�
at�p��5�
32�� Ventra,�Evoy,�and�Heflin�Jr�,�Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology,�supra note��at�p���
33�� Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology,�supra note�9�at�p��3�
34�� Ventra,�Evoy�and�Heflin�Jr�,�Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology,�supra note��at�p���
35�� ETC�Group,�“A�Tiny�Primer�on�Nano-Scale�Technologies�and�‘The�Little�Bang�Theory,’”�(June�2005)�–20,�
<http://www�etcgroup�org/upload/publication/55/0/tinyprimer_english�pdf>�at�p���
36�� Roy�Shenhar,�Tyler�B�Norsten�and�Vincent�M�Rotello,�“Self-Assembly�and�Self-Organization”�in�Ventra,�Evoy�
and�Heflin�Jr�,�Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology,�supra note�at�p��4�
37�� Guozhong�Cao,�Nanostructures & Nanomaterials: Synthesis, Properties & Applications�(Imperial�College�
Press,�2004)�at�p��v�
38�� Cao,�Nanostructure & Nanomaterials, supra note�37�at�p��v�
39�� MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�Countries,”�supra�note�5�at�p��2�
40�� MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�Countries,”�supra�note�5�at�p��2��
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may	exhibit	physical	properties	that	are	dramatically	different	than	those	in	macro	
form.41	This	discrepancy	is	due	to	the	fact	that	when	dealing	with	matter	smaller	
than	approximately	50	nanometers,	“the	laws	of	quantum	physics	supersede	those	
of	traditional	physics.”42	As	a	result,	shrinking	matter	to	the	level	of	the	nanometer	
scale	 can	 cause	 it	 to	exhibit	properties	 that	 it	does	not	exhibit	 at	 the	micro	or	
macro	scales,	such	as	“electrical	conductivity,	elasticity,	greater	strength,	different	
colour,	 [tolerance	 to	 temperature	 and	 pressure,43]	 and	 greater	 reactivity.”44	 For	
instance,	macro	scale	carbon	is	soft	and	malleable.45	At	the	nano-scale,	“carbon	
can	be	stronger	than	steel	and	is	six	times	lighter.”46	Zinc	oxide,	“usually	white	and	
opaque,”	becomes	transparent	at	the	nanoscale.47	Aluminum	can	“spontaneously	
combust	at	 the	nano-scale,”	a	property	which	 it	does	not	possess	at	 the	macro	
scale.48	Nano-particles	of	silver	have	some	ability	to	combat	microbes,	an	ability	
that	large	particles	do	not	display.49	The	discovery	of	these	new	physical	properties	
can	lead	to	technological	advancement	across	all	industrial	sectors.50
	
2.1.2.	Nanomaterials
Nanomaterials	 are	 arrangements	 of	 matter	 that	 exhibit	 unique	 characteristics	
and	properties	as	a	 result	of	 their	 size	 (approximately	1	 to	100	nanometers	 in	
length).51	They	are	nanotechnology’s	“building	blocks,”	the	foundation	of	future	
development	in	nanotechnology.52	John	C	Miller	notes	that	the	analogy	of	building	
a	house	is	appropriate	to	understanding	nanomaterials	and	nanotechnology:
Houses	can	be	comprised	of	a	variety	of	materials:	wood,	nails,	sheet	rock,	bricks,	
and	so	on.	Just	as	a	builder	puts	 together	different	shapes	and	pieces	of	 these	
materials	 to	 construct	 a	 home,	 nanotechnologists	 experiment	 with	 a	 variety	 of	
different	nanomaterials	to	build	complex	materials,	devices	and	systems.53
	 The	 key	 nanomaterials	 in	 existence	 today	 are	 fullerenes,	 carbon	 nanotubes,	
nanowires,	 semiconductor	 crystals	 (also	 referred	 to	 as	 quantum	 dots),	 and	
dendrimers.54	 Nanomaterials	 can	 be	 combined	 to	 form	 various	 structures,	
devices,	and	systems.55	The	present	challenge	in	nanotechnology	is	to	shift	from	
the	production	of	nanomaterials	to	“organizing	them	in	one-,	two-,	and	three-
dimensional	structures.”56	
4�� Cao,�Nanostructures & Nanomaterials, supra note�37�at�p��6�
42�� MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�Countries,”�supra�note�5�at�p��2�
43�� MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�Countries,”�supra�note�5�at�p��2�
44�� ETC�Group,�“A�Tiny�Primer�on�Nano�Scale�Technologies,”�supra�note�35�at�p���
45�� ETC�Group,�“A�Tiny�Primer�on�Nano�Scale�Technologies,”�supra�note�35�at�p��2�
46�� ETC�Group,�“A�Tiny�Primer�on�Nano�Scale�Technologies,”�supra�note�35�at�p��2�
47�� ETC�Group,�“A�Tiny�Primer�on�Nano�Scale�Technologies,”�supra�note�35�at�p��2�
48�� ETC�Group,�“A�Tiny�Primer�on�Nano�Scale�Technologies,”�supra�note�35�at�p��2�
49�� Jeffrey�H�Matsuura,�Nanotechnology Regulation and Policy Worldwide�(Artech�House,�2006)�at�p��0�
50�� Cao,�Nanostructure & Nanomaterials, supra note�37�at�p��v;�MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�
Countries,”�supra�note�5�at�p��2�
5�� Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note�9�at�p��3�
52�� Kotov,�Nanoparticle Assemblies and Superstructures, supra note�9�at�preface;�Ventra,�Evoy�and�Heflin�Jr�,�
Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology,�supra note��at�p��2;�Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of 
Nanotechnology, supra note�9�at�p��5�
53�� Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note�9�at�p��5��
54�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7;�Ventra,�Evoy�and�Heflin�Jr�,�Introduction to 
Nanoscale Science and Technology,�supra note��at�p��2�
55�� Ventra,�Evoy�and�Heflin�Jr�,�Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology,�supra note��at�p��2�
56�� Kotov,�Nanoparticle Assemblies and Superstructures, supra note�9�at�preface�
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2.2. Historical Development of Nanotechnology
Nobel-prize	 winning	 physicist	 Richard	 Feynman	 is	 credited	 as	 the	 first	
individual	 to	 engage	 with	 some	 of	 the	 fundamental	 concepts	 underlying	
nanotechnology.57	 On	 29	 December	 1959,	 in	 a	 lecture	 entitled	 “There’s	
Plenty	 of	 Room	 at	 the	 Bottom”	 presented	 at	 the	 annual	 meeting	 of	 the	
American	 Physical	 Society	 at	 the	 California	 Institute	 of	 Technology,	 Feynman	
discussed	 the	 possibilities	 of	 “manipulating	 and	 controlling	 matter”	 on	 the	
atomic	 scale.58	 Anticipating	 the	 opportunities	 that	 flow	 from	 working	 with	
matter	 subject	 to	 the	 laws	 of	 quantum	 mechanics,	 Feynman	 stated	 that:	
When	we	get	to	the	very,	very	small	world—say	circuits	of	seven	atoms—we	have	
a	 lot	 of	 new	 things	 that	 would	 happen	 that	 represent	 completely	 new	
opportunities	for	design.	Atoms	on	a	small	scale	behave	like	nothing	on	a	large	
scale,	for	they	satisfy	the	laws	of	quantum	mechanics.	So,	as	we	go	down	and	
fiddle	around	with	the	atoms	down	there,	we	are	working	with	different	laws,	and	
we	can	expect	to	do	different	things.	We	can	manufacture	in	different	ways.59
It	 took	 fifteen	 years	 from	 the	 date	 of	 Feynman’s	 lecture	 for	 the	
term	 “nanotechnology”	 to	 emerge.	 Coined	 by	 analogy	 to	 the	 epithet	
“microtechnology,”	which	is	“broadly	applied	to	any	technology	that	manipulated	
matter	at	the	micron	scale,”60	Tokyo	Science	University	Professor	Norio	Taniguchi	in	
a	1974	paper	defined	the	term	“nanotechnology”	as	“the	processing	of,	separation,	
consolidation,	and	deformation	of	materials	by	one	atom	or	one	molecule.”61
The	term	“nanotechnology”	was	explored	in	greater	depth	in	the	work	
of	K	Eric	Drexler.	In	1987,	Drexler	published	a	book	entitled	Engines	of	Creation:	
the	 Coming	 Era	 of	 Nanotechnology.62	 Some	mark	 the	 publication	 of	Engines	
of	Creation	 as	 the	point	where	 the	“field	of	nanotechnology	began	 its	 formal	
existence.”63	 In	 discussing	 nanotechnology’s	 potential,	 Drexler	 describes	 the	
ability	of	“replicating	assemblers	to	copy	themselves	by	the	ton,	then	make	other	
products	such	as	computers,	rocket	engines,	chairs,	and	so	forth.”64	He	states	that	
nanotechnology	will	enable	humanity	to	restore	damaged	ecosystems,	cure	the	
“disease”	called	aging,	return	some	species	from	apparent	extinction,	and	travel	
through	space	easily	and	conveniently	in	a	spacesuit	that	is	so	light	it	 is	barely	
noticeable.65	As	a	result	of	challenges	from	the	scientific	community	on	the	basis	
of	“technological	feasibility,”	Drexler	later	renamed	his	vision	of	nanotechnology	
57�� Roger�W�Whatmore,�“Nanotechnology—What�Is�It?�Should�We�Be�Worried?”�(2006)�56�Occupational 
Medicine�295–299,<http://occmed�oxfordjournals�org/cgi/reprint/56/5/295>�at�p��295��
58�� Richard�P�Feynman,�“There’s�Plenty�of�Room�at�the�Bottom,”�(February�960)�Engineering and Science,�
<http://www�zyvex�com/nanotech/feynman�html>��
59�� Feynman,�“There’s�Plenty�of�Room�at�the�Bottom,”�supra�note�58�at�p��8��
60�� Hall,�Nanofuture, supra note�2�at�p��8�
6�� Norio�Taniguchi,�“On�the�Basic�Concept�of�‘Nano-Technology,’”�(974)�Proceedings  of the International 
Conference of Production Engineering,�Part�II,�Society�of�Precision�Engineering,�Tokyo,�Japan,�cited�in�
Whatmore,�“Nanotechnology—What�Is�It?”�supra�note�57�at�p��296�
62�� K�Eric�Drexler,�Engines of Creation�(Oxford�University�Press,�986)�
63�� Francisco�Castro,�“Legal�and�Regulatory�Concerns�Facing�Nanotechnology,”�(2004)�4�Chicago-Kent Journal 
of Intellectual Property�40–46,�<http://jip�kentlaw�edu/art/volume%204/4%20Chi-Kent%20J%20Intell%20
Prop%2040�pdf>�at�p��40�
64�� Drexler,�Engines of Creation, supra note�62�
65�� Drexler,�Engines of Creation, supra note�62�
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“molecular	manufacturing.”66	In	so	doing,	Drexler	distanced	his	vision	from	the	
definition	of	nanotechnology	as	set	out	above.	
2.3. Nanotechnology’s Potential
Projected	 to	 be	 a	 “transformative	 technology”	 like	 the	 steam	 engine	 in	 the	
eighteenth	century,	electricity	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries,	and	
the	internet	today,67	nanotechnology	has	been	heralded	as	having	the	potential	to	
bring	about	a	new	kind	of	industrial	revolution.68	The	cross-industry	applicability	
of	 nanotechnology	 means	 that	 its	 technological	 impact	 “can	 probably	 not	
be	 compared	 with	 any	 other	 technical	 development	 up	 to	 the	 present	 time,	
since	 it	 will	 concern	 all	 aspects	 of	 human	 life.”69	 It	 has	 been	 predicted	 that	
nanotechnology	will	have	a	positive	impact	on	medical	applications,	information	
technologies,	energy	production	and	storage,	materials	science,	food,	water	and	
environmental	research,	and	security,	among	other	sectors.70	A	1996	UNESCO-
sponsored	study	states	that	“nanotechnology	will	provide	the	foundation	of	all	
technologies	in	the	new	century.”71
Although	some	point	to	nanotechnology’s	potential	to	widen	the	divide	
between	the	“haves”	and	“have-nots,”72	many	believe	that	it	can	be	used	for	the	
benefit	of	developing	countries.73	United	Nations	representatives	have	suggested	
that	nanotechnology	can	help	“reduce	 the	cost	and	 increase	 the	 likelihood	of	
attaining”	 the	Millennium	Development	Goals	 (MDG),	 eight	goals	 that	 aim	 to	
meet	the	needs	of	the	world’s	poorest	by	the	target	date	of	2015.74	
	
2.3.1.	Many	Patents	That	Have	Been	Granted	for	Nanomaterials	Encompass		
Basic	Scientific	Research	
Many	patents	that	have	been	granted	for	nanomaterials	encompass	basic	scientific	
research.	These	patents	are	broad,	uncertain,	vaguely	defined,	and	remain	at	a	
significant	distance	from	any	solution	to	a	specific	practical	problem.	Patenting	
basic	 research	 allows	 patentees	 to	 control	 large	 sectors	 of	 nanotechnology.	
66�� MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�Countries,”�supra�note�5�at�p��2�
67�� Mohamed�H�A�Hassan,�“Small�Things�and�Big�Changes�in�the�Developing�World,”�(�July�2005)�309�Science�
65–66,�<http://www�sciencemag�org/cgi/content/full/309/573/65>�at�p��65�
68�� Dal,�“From�Conventional�Technology�to�Carbon�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�2�at�p��3;�Schummer�and�
Baird,�Nanotechnology Challenges,�supra note�2�at�p�;��Hall,�Nanofuture,�supra note�2�at�p��9�
69�� Gunter�Schmid,�ed�,�Nanoparticles: From Theory to Application�(Wiley-VCH,�2004)�at�p���
70�� European�Commission,�Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnology�(European�Commission,�2002),�
<http://ec�europa�eu/nanotechnology/pdf/nano_com_en_new�pdf>�at�pp��4–5�
7�� Pat�Mooney,�“The�ETC�Century:�Erosion,�Technological�Transformation�and�Corporate�Concentration�in�the�
2st�Century,”�999:–2�Development Dialogue –28,�<http://www�etcgroup�org/en/materials/
publications�html?pub_id=28>�at�p��5,�cited�in�MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�Countries,”�
supra�note�5�
72�� Erin�Court,�Abdallah�S�Daar,�Elizabeth�Martin,�Tara�Acharya,�and�Peter�A�Singer,�“Will�Prince�Charles�Et�Al�
Diminish�the�Opportunities�of�Developing�Countries�in�Nanotechnology,”�(28�January�2004)�Nanotechweb.
org,�<http://nanotechweb�org/cws/article/indepth/8909>,�cited�in�MacLurcan,�“Nanotechnology�and�
Developing�Countries,”�supra�note�5�
73�� UNCTAD,�“Interactive�Dialogue�on�Harnessing�Emerging�Technologies�to�Meet�the�Millennium�
Development�Goals,”�supra�note�5;�Salamanca-Buentello�et al.,�“Nanotechnology�and�the�Developing�
World,”�supra�note�5�
74�� United�Nations,�The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005�(United�Nations,�2005),�<http://unstats�un�org/
unsd/mi/pdf/MDG%20Book�pdf>�at�pp��4–5��The�Millenium�Development�Goals�are:�(i)�eradicate�extreme�
poverty�and�hunger;�(ii)�achieve�universal�primary�education;�(iii)�promote�gender�equality�and�empower�women;�
(iv)�reduce�child�mortality;�(v)�improve�maternal�health;�(vi)�combat�HIV/AIDS,�malaria�and�other�diseases;�(vii)�
ensure�environmental�sustainability;�and�(viii)�develop�a�global�partnership�for�development�
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Consequently,	 patents	 encompassing	 basic	 research	 are	 attractive	 to	 persons	
seeking	to	establish	a	dominant	presence	in	the	nanotechnology	industry.	
	
*
3. THE PATENTING OF BASIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE US
nanoTEchnology is ThE firsT modErn TEchnology	to	have	its	basic	research	
patented.75	 The	 basic	 research	 of	 most	 other	 twentieth-century	 technologies,	
including	 the	 computer,	 software,	 internet,	 and	 biotechnology,	 generally	
remained	 in	 the	 public	 domain.76	 Historically,	 the	 US	 academic	 scientific	
community	had	been	reluctant	to	secure	property	rights	in	basic	research.77	The	
reluctance	of	US	academic	researchers	to	patent	basic	research	was	supported	
by	traditional	scientific	norms,	government	policy,	the	reward	theory	of	patent	
law,	and	 judicial	decisions	that	discouraged	the	patentability	of	basic	scientific	
research.	This	 attitude	of	general	 reluctance	 towards	patenting	basic	 research	
will	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 “commons	 model.”	 During	 the	 period	 when	 the	
commons	model	was	the	prevailing	model	of	patenting,	a	significant	proportion	
of	basic	scientific	research	made	its	way	into	the	public	domain.		
For	 instance,	 the	 computer,	 “largely	 the	 result	 of	 military	 research	
projects	 during	 World	 War	 II,”78	 remained	 unpatented	 due	 both	 to	 military	
secrecy	and	to	the	fact	that,	at	that	time,	“government-sponsored	research	was	
not	generally	patented.”79	Basic	software	remained	unpatented	during	the	1960s,	
1970s,	 and	 early	 1980s	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 courts’	 determination	 that	 software	
was	not	patentable	subject	matter.80	The	internet’s	basic	protocols	remain	in	the	
public	 domain	 due	 to	 the	 traditional	 attitude	 that	 inventions	 developed	 with	
federal	funding	and	at	universities	should	not	receive	patent	protection.81	These	
traditional	attitudes	also	led	to	biotechnology’s	basic	inventions	ending	up	in	the	
public	domain.82
Beginning	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	a	series	of	changes	led	to	widespread	
support	for	the	patenting	of	basic	scientific	research.83	One	contributing	factor	
was	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 development-oriented	 model	 of	 patenting.84	 The	
development-oriented	model	 is	 centered	 on	 the	 view	 that	 patents	 should	 be	
granted	 early	 in	 the	process	 of	 innovation	 so	 as	 to	 “induce…firms	 to	 commit	
resources	to	the	development	of	inventions.”85	Edmund	Kitch’s	“prospect	theory,”	
introduced	in	1977	in	his	essay	“The	Nature	and	Function	of	the	Patent	System,”	
75�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�pp��605–606�
76�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�p��63�
77�� Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research,”�supra note�2�at�p��88��
78�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�pp��606–607��
79�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�pp��606-607�
80�� Gottschalk�v Benson (USA�SC,�972),�<http://supreme�vlex�com/vid/gottschalk-v-benson-998780>,�409�
United States Reports 64;�Parker v Flook�(USA�SC,�978),�437�United States Reports 584;�Parker v Flook is�
cited�in�Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�p��608� 
8�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�p��608�
82�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�pp��609–6�
83�� Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research,”�supra note�2�at�p��94�
84�� When�this�paper�refers�to�the�development-oriented�perspective�to�patent�rights,�it�is�referring�to�
development�in�the�context�of�commercialization�of�research�
85�� Roberto�Mazzoleni�and�Richard�R�Nelson,�“The�Benefits�and�Costs�of�Strong�Patent�Protection:�A�
Contribution�to�the�Current�Debate,”�(998)�27:3�Research Policy�273–284�at�p��277�
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is	 the	 seminal	 academic	 example	 of	 the	 development-oriented	 approach.86	 In	
this	 work,	 Kitch	 argues	 that	 the	 “reward	 theory”	 (at	 that	 time	 the	 prevailing	
economic	 theory	 in	patent	 law)	offers	an	“incomplete	picture	of	 the	 functions	
of	 the	 patent	 system.”87	 He	 states	 that	 the	 patent	 system	 performs	 another	
function,	not	previously	noted.88	Namely,	the	patent	system	helps	promote	the	
efficient	allocation	of	resources	among	prospects,	thereby	increasing	the	output	
of	 resources	 used	 for	 technological	 innovation.89	 It	 does	 so	by	permitting	 the	
granting	 of	 broad	 patents	 on	 prospects,	 shortly	 after	 their	 discovery.90	 The	
patentee	is	then	placed	in	a	position	to	monitor	and	coordinate	the	development	
of	 the	prospect	 through	 licensing.91	 Kitch	 calls	 this	 view	of	 the	patent	 system	
“prospect	theory.”92	It	has	been	described	as	“one	of	the	most	significant	efforts	
to	integrate	intellectual	property	with	property	rights	theory.”93
	 The	 theoretical	 foundations	of	prospect	 theory	are	 the	 tragedy	of	 the	
commons	and	the	hypothetical	Coasean	world	with	zero	transaction	costs.94	A	
tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 occurs	 where	multiple	 individuals	 have	 privileges	 of	
use	in	a	scarce	resource,	and	“no	one	has	the	right	to	exclude	another.”95	As	a	
result,	the	resource	is	prone	to	overexploitation.96	The	concept	of	the	“tragedy	
of	the	commons”	was	popularized	by	Garrett	Hardin.97	Two	classic	examples	of	
the	“tragedy	of	 the	commons”	are	depleted	fisheries	and	overgrazed	fields.98	
Heller	and	Eisenberg	note	that	“[t]oday,	Hardin’s	metaphor	is	central	to	debates	
in	 economics,	 law,	 and	 science	 and	 is	 a	 powerful	 justification	 for	 privatizing	
commons	property.”99
	 In	his	essay	“The	Optimal	Timing	of	Innovation,”	Yoram	Barzel	applies	
Hardin’s	“tragedy	of	the	commons”	principle	to	scientific	research.	He	takes	the	
position	that	like	common	fields	and	fisheries,	basic	scientific	knowledge	is	a	free	
public	good.100	Barzel	believes	that	“since	the	basic	knowledge	is	costless	to	the	
innovator,	he	introduces	a	discovery	when	it	first	becomes	profitable	instead	of	
waiting	until	profits	are	maximized.”101	He	states	that	in	this	way,	basic	knowledge	
is	 “overexploited	 comparably	 to	 public	 roads,	 fisheries,	 and	 oil	 and	 water	
pools.”102	In	the	case	of	basic	knowledge	used	by	innovators,	“the	excessive	use	
86�� Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research,”�supra note�2�at�p��20;�Kitch,�“The�Nature�and�Function�of�the�Patent�
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research��Rather,�Reichman�argues�that�Kitch’s�prospect�theory�“spearheaded�[the]�shift”�towards�widespread�
support�for�patenting�of�basic�research��Jerome�H�Reichman,�“Computer�Programs�as�Applied�Scientific�
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of	resources	takes	the	form	of	their	premature	application.”103
	 The	 conventional	 solution	 to	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 is	 the	
privatization	of	the	commons.104	It	is	thought	that	if	property	owners	suffer	the	
full	 cost	 consequence	 of	 their	 actions,	 they	 will	 not	 overuse	 the	 resource.105 
In	 order	 to	 remedy	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 in	 basic	 scientific	 research,	
Barzel	recommends	converting	basic	scientific	research	into	private	property.106	
Specifically,	Barzel	proposes	that,	“by	granting	(or	auctioning)	monopoly	rights	on	
potential	innovations	before	resources	are	committed	to	the	innovating	activity,”	
the	 patent	 system	 can	 prevent	 such	 a	 premature	 allocation	 of	 resources.107	
According	 to	 Barzel,	 private	 ownership	 will	 allow	 the	 grantee	 of	 the	 rights	
to	maximize	 the	 present	 value	 of	 the	 object	 of	 ownership	 by	 undertaking	 (or	
contracting	 for)	 “the	 innovation	 investment	at	 that	point	of	 time	which	 is	also	
socially	optimal.”108
Kitch’s	 ideas	 for	prospect	 theory	“crystallized”	 in	 response	 to	Barzel’s	
essay.109	 Kitch	 concurs	 with	 Barzel’s	 statement	 that	 potential	 innovations	
(prospects)	 are	a	 form	of	public	good,	 comparable	 to	fisheries,	oil,	or	mineral	
claims,	 that	 will	 “not	 be	 efficiently	 used	 absent	 exclusive	 ownership.”110	 Each	
public	 prospect	 can	be	pursued	by	multiple	 firms,	 each	of	which	 can	 use	 any	
level	of	resources	to	develop	the	prospect.111	Firms	also	need	not	disclose	their	
activities	 to	 their	 competitors.112	 This	 results	 in	 wastefulness	 as	 firms	 expend	
valuable	scarce	resources	attempting	to	develop	the	same	prospect.113	
Rather	 than	 adopt	 Barzel’s	 method	 of	 “granting”	 or	 “auctioning”	
monopoly	rights	in	potential	innovations,	however,	Kitch	takes	the	position	that	
the	most	 efficient	way	 to	 privatize	 prospects	 is	 through	 the	 patent	 system.114	
Kitch	 advocates	 awarding	 patents	 to	 prospects	 shortly	 after	 their	 discovery,	
“even	 though	 the	 practical	 significance	 of	 the	 innovation	 may	 be	 but	 dimly	
perceived.”115	 Kitch	 notes	 that	 since	 the	patent	 owner	 has	 the	 exclusive	 right	
to	develop	the	patented	technology,	no	one	 is	 likely	 to	 invest	 in	 the	prospect	
without	first	making	arrangements	with	the	patent	owner.116	Otherwise,	lacking	a	
license	to	the	underlying	prospect,	they	may	not	be	able	to	reap	the	benefits	of	
their	investment.	The	patent	owner	is	thus	placed	in	a	controlling	position	with	
respect	to	the	prospect.	She	can	seek	out	or	entertain	licensees,	cause	prospective	
searchers	to	exchange	information,	and	avoid	duplicative	investments,	thereby	
maximizing	 the	 resources	 available	 for	 innovation.	 Burk	 and	 Lemley	 note	 that	
“this	is	the	Coase	theorem	at	work”:
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under	that	theorem,	giving	one	party	the	power	to	control	and	orchestrate	all	
subsequent	 use	 and	 research	 relating	 to	 the	 patented	 technology	 should	
result	 in	efficient	 licensing,	both	 to	end	users	and	 to	potential	 improvers—
assuming,	 that	 is,	 that	 information	 is	 perfect,	 all	 parties	 are	 rational,	 and	
licensing	is	costless.117
Kitch	 argues	 that	 the	 “prospect	 function”	 is	 a	 “significant,	 if	 not	 the	
predominant,	 function	 of	 the	 American	 patent	 system	 as	 it	 has	 operated	
in	 fact.”118	He	bases	 this	 statement	 on	 three	 features	 of	 the	American	patent	
system.119	First,	he	states	that	the	scope	accorded	to	patent	claims	reaches	“well	
beyond	what	the	reward	function	would	require.”120	In	support	of	this	point,	Kitch	
provides	various	examples	where	the	patent	claim	has	been	held	to	include	more	
than	what	was	made	or	accomplished	by	the	inventor	at	the	time	of	patenting.121	
Second,	 Kitch	 states	 that	 “many	 technologically	 important	 patents	 have	been	
issued	 long	 before	 commercial	 exploitation	 became	 possible.”122	 He	 provides	
a	 table	 of	 case	 studies	 to	 support	 his	 point.	 Third,	 Kitch	 notes	 that	 rules	 of	
patentability	 (such	 as	priority	 and	 time-bar)	 “force	 an	early	patent	 application	
whether	or	not	something	of	value	(and	hence	a	reward)	has	been	found.”123	
Development-oriented	 arguments	 were	 a	 significant	 factor	 in	 the	
“dramatic	 shift”	 in	 the	 legal	 framework	 surrounding	 scientific	 research.124	
Faced	with	 “mounting	 […]	 evidence	 […]	 that	 the	US	 [was]	 falling	 behind	 its	
international	competition	in	the	development	of	new	products	and	inventions,”	
Congress	decided	that	in	order	to	“[rescue]	the	results	of	federally	sponsored	
research	 […]	 from	 oblivion	 and	 successfully	 develop	 [them]	 into	 commercial	
products,”	 as	 Eisenberg	 states,	 the	 results	 of	 federally	 sponsored	 research	
would	have	to	be	“patented	and	offered	up	for	private	appropriation.”125	As	a	
result,	the	US	government,	beginning	in	1980,	“embarked	on	a	concerted	effort	
to	 apply	 property-based	 incentives	 to	 scientific	 research.”126	 This	 concerted	
effort	 is	demonstrated	 in	 the	passage	of	various	 technology	transfer	statutes	
that	encourage	government	agencies,	educational	institutions,	and	non-profit	
institutions	 to	apply	 for	patents	on	 inventions	derived	 from	 federally	 funded	
research.127	 The	most	 influential	 of	 these	 technology	 transfer	 statutes	 is	 the	
Bayh-Dole	 Act.128	 Passed	 in	 1980,	 the	 Bayh-Dole	 Act	 gives	 universities	 and	
small	businesses	the	right	to	“seek	patent	rights	on	the	results	of	their	federally	
sponsored	 research	 and	 to	 retain	 patent	 ownership	 themselves.”129	 It	 also	
requires	universities	to	share	patent	royalties	with	individual	inventors.	The	stated	
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policy	objective	of	the	Bayh-Dole	Act	is	“to	use	the	patent	system	to	promote	the	
utilization	of	inventions	from	federally	supported	research	or	development.”130
The	 expansion	 of	 property	 rights	 in	 research	 “initially	 met	 with	 loud	
outcries	from	the	scientific	community.”131	However,	“universities	and	individual	
researchers	soon	began	to	respond	to	the	financial	 incentives	of	Bayh-Dole	by	
rejecting	 communalism	 and	 increasing	 efforts	 to	 seek	 patents.”132	 The	 period	
between	1980	and	2003	saw	a	near	sixteen-fold	increase	in	patents	granted	to	
universities	(from	approximately	250	US	patents	per	year	in	1980	to	3933	patents	
per	year	in	2003).133	The	development	of	the	public	domain	was	further	limited	
by	partnerships	between	academia	and	 industry	 that	 restricted	 the	options	of	
scientists	seeking	to	publish	their	results	in	the	public	domain.134
Development-oriented	arguments	were	also	used	to	justify	the	creation,	
in	1982,	of	 the	CAFC,	a	unified	court	 responsible	 for	all	patent	appeals.135	Rai	
states	that:	
	
proponents	 of	 a	 single	 forum	 for	 patent	 appeals	 argued	 that	 the	 stronger	
patent	rights	created	by	a	more	uniform	interpretation	of	the	patent	law	were	
necessary	for	economic	growth	and	international	competitiveness.136	
The	 view	 that	 the	 predominant	 function	 of	 patent	 rights	 is	 to	 promote	 the	
efficient	 development	 and	 commercialization	 of	 research	 has	 been	 evident	 in	
case	 law	 emerging	 from	 the	CAFC.137	 The	CAFC	weakened	 both	 the	 utility	 and	
nonobviousness	standards	of	patentability,	and	expanded	the	range	of	subject	matter	
that	could	be	patented.138	Taken	together,	these	theoretical	and	legislative	changes	
helped	create	an	environment	 that	 supported	 the	widespread	patenting	of	basic	
research.	Nanotechnology	is	the	first	technology	to	emerge	into	this	environment.
	
*
4. ANTICOMMONS THEORY
This parT will firsT providE an ovErviEw	of	anticommons	 theory.	Second,	 it	
will	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 use	 anticommons	 theory	 to	 critique	 the	
development-oriented	approach.	
 
4.1. Overview of Anticommons Theory
Heller	 and	 Eisenberg	 describe	 anticommons	 property	 as	 the	 mirror	 image	
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of	 commons	property.139	 In	 commons	property,	 “owners	hold	 rights	not	 to	be	
excluded”	from	a	scarce	resource.140	This	situation	can	lead	to	overexploitation	
of	the	resource,	referred	to	by	Hardin	and	others	as	a	tragedy	of	the	commons.141	
Two	canonical	examples	of	 the	 tragedy	of	 the	commons	are	overgrazed	fields	
and	depleted	lakes.	The	conventional	solution	to	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	is	
the	privatization	of	the	resource.142
Privatization,	however,	though	solving	the	tragedy	of	the	commons,	can	
cause	another	tragedy,	that	of	the	anticommons.143	Heller	notes	that	though	the	
tragedy	of	the	commons	metaphor	reveals	the	cost	of	overuse	when	many	people	
are	given	rights	to	use	a	scarce	resource,	it	“overlooks	the	possibility	of	underuse	
when	governments	give	too	many	people	rights	to	exclude	others.”144	The	latter	
situation	describes	an	anticommons,	a	situation	where	“too	many	individuals	have	
rights	of	exclusion	in	a	scarce	resource.”145	The	scarce	resource	can	be	utilized	
only	after	all	of	these	rights	of	exclusion	have	been	bundled	together.146
An	 anticommons	 problem	 can	 arise	 horizontally,	 vertically,	 or	 through	
a	patent	thicket.147	An	anticommons	problem	arises	horizontally	when	a	person	
has	to	secure	licenses	to	concurrent	fragments	of	rights	in	order	to	use	a	single	
resource.148	One	example	of	a	horizontal	anticommons	 is	described	 in	Heller’s	
“The	 Tragedy	 of	 the	 Anticommons,”	 namely	 “empty	 Moscow	 storefronts.”149	
If	 one	 wishes	 to	 set	 up	 shop,	 one	 must	 secure	 the	 consent	 of	 all	 individual	
rightholders,	including	those	individuals	endowed	with	the	right	to	sell,	receive	
sale	revenue,	lease,	receive	lease	revenue,	occupy,	and	determine	use.	150	If	these	
concurrent	rights	cannot	be	assembled,	the	anticommons	will	turn	tragic	and	the	
storefront	will	go	underused.	Another	example	of	a	horizontal	anticommons	can	
be	found	in	basic	biomedical	research,	where	individuals	must	assemble	multiple	
gene	 fragments	 held	 by	 different	 patentees	 in	 order	 to	 create	 a	 commercial	
product.151	 The	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anticommons	 arises	 vertically	 when	 there	 are	
“too	 many	 upstream	 patent	 owners	 [stacking]	 licenses	 on	 top	 of	 the	 future	
discoveries	of	downstream	use.”152	One	situation	in	which	this	tragedy	occurs	is	
where	companies	attempt	to	integrate	patents	on	basic	scientific	research	with	
those	on	downstream	innovations.153	Lastly,	Siva	Vaidhyanathan	notes	that	“one	
acutely	pernicious	 form	of	 the	anti-commons	problem	 is	a	 ‘patent	 thicket.’”154	
The	concept	of	a	“patent	thicket,”	developed	by	economist	Carl	Shapiro,	refers	
to	overlapping	spheres	of	intellectual	property	rights	that	a	company	must	“hack	
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53�� Burk�and�Lemley,�“Policy�Levers�in�Patent�Law,”�supra�note�3�at�pp��62–63�
54�� Siva�Vaidhyanathan,�“Nanotechnology�and�the�Law�of�Patents:�A�Collision�Course,” in�Geoffrey�Hunt�and�
Michael�Mehta,�eds�,�Nanotechnology: Risk, Ethics and Law (Earthscan,�2006)�20�<http://papers�ssrn�com/
sol3/papers�cfm?abstract_id=740550>�
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its	way	through”	in	order	to	commercialize	a	new	product.155	Patent	thickets	are	
considered	to	“discourage	and	stifle	innovation.”156	
The	 anticommons	 will	 not	 necessarily	 become	 tragic.157	 If	 there	 are	
no	 transaction	costs	or	holdouts,	“owners	may	keep	property	 in	anticommons	
form	and	perfectly	coordinate	its	use	so	its	performance	mimics	that	of	private	
property.”158 Transaction	costs	and	strategic	behaviour,	however,	can	sometimes	
prevent	 the	 assembly	 of	 the	 necessary	 rights.159	 As	 Heller	 notes,	 “once	 an	
anticommons	emerges,	collecting	rights	into	usable	private	property	bundles	can	
be	brutal	and	uneven.”160	With	respect	to	transaction	costs,	it	can	be	difficult	and	
expensive	to	determine	exactly	which	rights	are	needed	in	order	to	develop	the	
resource.161	Furthermore,	certain	patent	holders	may	decide	to	act	strategically	
as	holdouts,	refusing	to	license	their	patent	unless	they	are	paid	a	sum	in	excess	
of	 the	 value	 of	 their	 patent	 (and	 in	 certain	 cases	 a	 “bribe	 close	 to	 the	 value	
of	 the	 entire	 project”162).	 Burk	 and	 Lemley	 note	 that	 “every	 property	 holder	
needed	for	the	project	is	subject	to	this	same	incentive.”163	The	holdout	problem	
is	accentuated	in	the	case	of	an	anticommons	at	the	level	of	basic	research,	 in	
which	case	the	“value”	of	a	resource	itself	is	sometimes	difficult	to	determine	with	
any	accuracy.164	The	“tragedy”	of	the	anticommons	occurs	where	individuals	are	
unable	to	assemble	the	fragmented	or	overlapping	rights,	causing	the	resource	
to	be	underused.	
4.2. It is Appropriate to Use Anticommons Theory to Challenge Development-
Oriented Theorists’ Commitment to Patenting Basic Scientific Research
The	 theoretical	 foundations	 of	 the	 development-oriented	 approach	 are	 the	
metaphor	of	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	and	the	hypothetical	Coasean	world	
with	 zero	 transaction	 costs.	 Anticommons	 theory	 engages	with	 both	 of	 these	
theoretical	 issues.	As	 a	 result,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	use	 anticommons	 theory	 to	
challenge	development-oriented	theorists’	belief	 that	patenting	basic	 research	
will	necessarily	lead	to	its	efficient	development	and	commercialization.		
Development-oriented	theorists	rely	on	the	“tragedy	of	the	commons”	
principle.	They	argue	that	early	patenting	of	scientific	prospects	will	overcome	
the	“tragedy	of	 the	commons”	 in	 scientific	 research	by	eliminating	“wasteful”	
duplicative	 investment,	 thus	 promoting	 the	 efficient	 development	 and	
commercialization	 of	 research.	 Anticommons	 theorists	 also	 engage	 with	 the	
“tragedy	of	the	commons”	principle.	They	argue	that	 in	certain	circumstances,	
55�� Carl�Shapiro,�“Navigating�the�Patent�Thicket:�Cross�Licenses,�Patent�Pools�and�Standard�Setting,”�in�Adam�
Jaffe,�Joshua�Lerner,�and�Scott�Stern,�eds�,�Innovation Policy and the Economy�(MIT�Press,�200)�9–50,�
<http://faculty�haas�berkeley�edu/shapiro/thicket�pdf>�at�pp��9–20;�Raj�Bawa,�“Will�the�Nanomedicine�
‘Patent�Land�Grab’�Thwart�Commercialization?”�(2005)�:4�Nanomedicine: Nanotechnology, Biology, and 
Medicine�346–350�at�p��348�
56�� Bawa,�“Will�the�Nanomedicine�‘Patent�Land�Grab’�Thwart�Commercialization?”�supra note�55�at�p��348;�
Shapiro,�“Navigating�the�Patent�Thicket,”�supra note�55�at�p��9��
57�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��673�
58�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��673�
59�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�pp��673–674;�Burk�and�Lemley,�“Policy�Levers�
in�Patent�Law,”�supra�note�3�at�p��6�
60�� Heller�and�Eisenberg,�“Can�Patents�Deter�Innovation?”�supra�note�20�at�p��698;�Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�
Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��678�
6�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��673�
62�� Burk�and�Lemley,�“Policy�Levers�in�Patent�Law,”�supra�note�3�at�p��6�
63�� Burk�and�Lemley,�“Policy�Levers�in�Patent�Law,”�supra�note�3�at�pp��6–62�
64�� Heller�and�Eisenberg,�“Can�Patents�Deter�Innovation?”�supra�note�20�at�p��699�
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the	 attempt	 to	 overcome	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 by	 granting	 property	
rights	in	a	scarce	resource	can	cause	another	tragedy,	that	of	the	anticommons.	
Thus,	 rather	 than	 facilitating	 the	 efficient	 development	 and	 commercialization	
of	research,	the	attempt	to	remedy	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	by	patenting	
basic	 scientific	 research	may,	 in	 fact,	 stifle	 innovation.	 Due	 to	 the	 connection	
between	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 and	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anticommons,	
it	 is	appropriate	to	use	anticommons	theory	to	challenge	the	assumption	held	
by	development-oriented	 theorists	 that	broad	patenting	of	basic	 research	will	
necessarily	lead	to	the	efficient	development	and	commercialization	of	research.
Development-oriented	theorists	argue	that	granting	broad	patent	rights	
on	basic	research	will	not	be	problematic,	as	parties	will	be	able	to	license	patents	
efficiently.	This	argument	is	premised	on	the	existence	of	the	hypothetical	Coasean	
world	 with	 zero	 transaction	 costs.165	 Anticommons	 theory,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
emphasizes	the	transaction	costs	and	strategic	behaviours	absent	in	the	hypothetical	
Coasean	 world.	 While	 development-oriented	 theorists	 assume	 that	 transaction	
costs	are	non-existent,	anticommons	 theorists	call	attention	 to	 the	difficulties	 in	
assembling	fragmented	and	overlapping	property	rights.	Due	to	their	conflicting	
views	on	the	importance	of	transaction	and	strategic	costs,	it	is	appropriate	to	use	
anticommons	theory	to	challenge	the	assumption,	held	by	development-oriented	
theorists,	that	parties	will	be	able	to	license	patents	efficiently.	
	
	
*
5. THE NANOTECHNOLOGY ANTICOMMONS IN THE US
5.1. The Nanotechnology Patent “Gold Rush”
major paTEnT officEs worldwidE arE granTing	 nanotech	 patents	 at	 an	
extraordinary	pace.166		Lux	Research,	a	company	that	provides	market	intelligence	
and	 strategic	 advice	 on	 the	 physical	 sciences,	 has	 described	 the	 race	 for	
nanotechnology	 patents	 as	 a	 “gold	 rush”	 involving	 the	 world’s	 largest	
transnationals,	 leading	university	 labs,	and	nanotech	start-ups,	where	“patents	
are	the	precious	resource	being	hoarded.”167	This	gold	rush	has	primarily	been	
directed	at	nanomaterials,	nanotechnology’s	building	blocks.168	Many	companies	
have	obtained	patents	that	fence	off	large	areas	of	basic	research	in	nanomaterials.	
They	have	done	so	in	order	to	secure	a	controlling	position	in	nanotechnology.	
 
 
 
 
65�� Burk�and�Lemley,�“Policy�Levers�in�Patent�Law,”�supra�note�3�at�p��600�
66�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7�at�p��;�Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�
supra note�0�at�p��60��David�S�Almeling�notes�that�between�997�and�2002,�the�number�of�
nanotechnology�patents�increased�600%,�from�370�to�2,650��David�S�Almeling,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology:�
Problems�with�the�Utility�Requirement,”�(December�2004)�2004�Stanford Technology Law Review N,�
<http://stlr�stanford�edu/STLR/Articles/04_STLR_N/fsarticle�htm>��at�para��2,�citing�Henry�M�Heines,�
“Patent�Trends�in�Nanotechnology,”�(September�2003)�99:9�Chemical Engineering Progress�22�
67�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7�at�p���
68�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7�at�p���
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5.2. The Nanotechnology Gold Rush has Resulted in the Creation of an 
Anticommons in Nanomaterials in the US169
Studies	suggest	that	the	nanotechnology	gold	rush	has	resulted	in	the	creation	
of	an	anticommons	in	nanomaterials	in	the	US.170	An	anticommons	is	defined	as	a	
situation	in	which	multiple	exclusionary	rights	exist	in	a	scarce	resource.	Due	to	the	
presence	of	multiple	exclusionary	rights,	no	one	has	an	effective	privilege	of	use	in	
the	scarce	resource.	The	nanomaterials	patent	landscape	is	characterized	by	the	
presence	of	multiple	exclusionary	rights.	The	patent	landscape	in	nanomaterials	
is	“complex	and	fragmented.”171	The	nanotechnology	“gold	rush”	has	resulted	in	
the	issuance	of	“broad	and	over-lapping	claims”	and	the	creation	of	a	“somewhat	
chaotic”	nanotechnology	patent	landscape,	especially	for	nanomaterials.172	One	
cannot	use	a	nanomaterial	without	first	securing	licenses	to	all	of	the	fragmented	
and	overlapping	patent	claims	on	that	nanomaterial.173	
In	nanotechnology,	anticommons	likely	exist	horizontally,	vertically,	and	
through	 patent	 thickets.	 Horizontal	 anticommons	 have	 been	 created	 in	 two	
main	ways.	First,	persons	wishing	to	use	a	nanomaterial	must	assemble	all	of	the	
fragmented	and	overlapping	rights	with	respect	to	that	nanomaterial.	Second,	
persons	wishing	to	use	a	variety	of	nanomaterials	to	construct	a	nanostructure	
must	 attempt	 to	 secure	 licenses	 for	 all	 of	 the	 nanomaterials	 involved.	Vertical	
anticommons	 are	 likely	 to	 exist	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 nanotechnology	
anticommons	occurs	at	the	building	block	level.	As	a	result,	patent	holders	will	
likely	attempt	to	stack	licenses	on	future	downstream	discoveries.	Lastly,	patent	
thickets	have	developed	in	nanomaterials.	Many	of	the	patents	that	have	been	
issued	for	nanomaterials	are	broad	and	overlapping.	The	ETC	Group	notes	that	
patent	thickets	at	the	level	of	“fundamental	nano-scale	materials	[…]	are	already	
creating	thorny	barriers	for	would-be	innovators.”174		
69�� The�following�analysis�is�based�primarily�on�the�results�of�a�Lux�Research�report,�supplemented�by�other�
sources�where�appropriate�(Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7)��The�Lux�report�was�
based�on�a�comprehensive�review�of�,084�US�patents�(representing�9,485�claims)�that�relate�to�five�
nanomaterials�(dendrimers,�quantum�dots,�carbon�nanotubes,�fullerenes,�and�nanowires)��Ruben�Serrato�
describes�the�methodology�used�in�this�report�to�compile�and�categorize�patents�as�“superb,”�and�states�
that�“the�authors�do�an�outstanding�job�of�collecting�accurate�data�and�identifying�general�trends�in�
nanotech�patents�”�Serrato,�describing�the�methodology�of�the�report,�states�that�“the�authors�carefully�
searched�patents�with�synonyms�for�the�platform�name�as�well�as�key�inventors�for�each�patent�by�
individual�and�company��Additionally,�the�team�carefully�reviewed�the�claims�of�each�patent�to�ensure�its�
relevance��The�patents�were�then�classified�by�type:�()�building�block;�(2)�product;�(3)�process�of�
manufacture;�and�(4)�method�of�use—and�by�application�category:�()�general;�(2)�structural�materials;�(3)�
energy;�(4)�optics;�(5)�electronics;�(6)�healthcare�and�cosmetics;�and�(7)�other��After�categorizing�a�patent’s�
individual�claims,�they�assigned�the�patent�itself�to�the�category�containing�the�greatest�number�of�its�
constituent�claims��After�classifying�the�claims,�they�ran�statistics�to�score�patents�for�each�nanomaterial�
platform�in�each�application�category�on�two�axes:�“white�space,”�comprising�four�metrics,�and�“freedom�
from�entanglement,”�comprising�seven�metrics�”�Serrato�notes�that�“[t]his�report�can�serve�as�an�effective�
tool�for�those�involved�in�analyzing�the�patent�landscape�and�identifying�the�key�patents�and�patent�
holders��CEOs,�technical�staff,�lawyers�and�investors�now�have�a�quick�and�effective�way�to�review�patent�
landscapes�”�Ruben�Serrato,�Kirk�Hermann�and�Chris�Douglas,�“The�Nanotech�Intellectual�Property�(“IP”)�
Landscape,”�(2005)�2:2�Nanotechnology Law & Business�2–6,�<http://www�foley�com/files/tbl_
s3Publications/FileUpload37/272/viewcontent�pdf>�at�p��2��
70�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7;�Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology, 
supra note�9��
7�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7�at�p��;�Lemley�notes�that�“risks�of�a�patent�
thicket�may�be�exacerbated�by�the�application�of�pre-nanotechnology�patents�to�nanotech�inventions�”�
Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”supra note�0�at�pp��620–62�
72�� Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note�9�at�p��65�
73�� Lux�Research,�“Nanotechnology�Gold�Rush,”�supra�note�7�at�p���
74�� ETC�Group,�“Nanotech’s�‘Second�Nature’�Patents”�(ETC�Group,�June�2005),�<http://www�etcgroup�org/
upload/publication/pdf_file/54��at�p��5��
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5.3. Consequences of the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Nanotechnology
If	potential	users	cannot	assemble	the	fragmented	and	overlapping	nanomaterials	
patents	 into	 usable	 bundles,	 the	 nanotechnology	 industry	 could	 experience	
significant	 slowdowns.175	 These	 could	 occur	 in	 four	 ways.	 First,	 faced	 with	
licensing	roadblocks,	companies	could	choose	to	engage	in	protracted	litigation	
in	order	to	overcome	the	nanotechnology	anticommons.176	The	nanotechnology	
industry	could	stagnate	as	 funds	are	diverted	 towards	court	battles	 instead	of	
research	and	development.	Second,	the	number	of	overlapping	and	fragmented	
patents	 on	 nanotechnology’s	 building	 blocks	 could	 act	 as	 a	 deterrent	 to	 new	
investment.	 This	 deterrent	 could	 “severely	 [limit…]	 the	 potential	 commercial	
impact	of	nanotechnology.”177	In	the	context	of	nanomedicine,	one	commentator	
notes	that:	
	
if	such	a	dismal	patent	climate	persists,	investors	are	unlikely	to	invest	in	risky	
nanomedicine	 commercialization	 efforts.	 For	 them,	 competing	 in	 this	 high-
stakes	patent	game	may	prove	to	be	too	costly.178	
Such	 companies	may	 choose	 to	 invest	 their	 resources	 elsewhere,	 avoiding	 the	
nanotechnology	anticommons	altogether.	Third,	anticipating	industry	slowdowns,	
companies	 could	 choose	 to	 disengage	 from	 the	 nanotechnology	 industry,	
withdrawing	 their	 capital	and	 investing	 in	other	areas.	Fourth,	public	 funding	 in	
nanotechnology	could	decrease	as	a	result	of	the	tragedy	of	the	anticommons	in	
nanotechnology,	as	the	US	government	may	not	wish	to	fund	a	stagnating	industry.
	
		
*
6. USING INFORMAL MARKET MECHANISMS TO OVERCOME THE 
ANTICOMMONS
ThE mErE prEsEncE of an anTicommons will	 not	 necessarily	 prevent	 the	
efficient	 development	 and	 commercialization	 of	 nanomaterials.179	 If	 parties	
license	their	technology	widely,	the	fragmented,	overlapping	patent	landscape	
“will	not	stifle	development	of	products	based	on	nanotechnology.”180	Assuming	
that	there	are	no	transaction	costs	or	holdouts,	“owners	may	keep	property	in	
anticommons	 form	and	perfectly	coordinate	 its	use	so	 its	performance	mimics	
75�� The�ETC�Group�warns�that�intellectual�property�roadblocks�could�“severely�retard�development�of�
nanotechnology�”�Miller�et al,�supra note�9�at�p��65��In�2002,�the�US-based�industry�trade�group,�
Nanotechnology�Business�Alliance,�warned�in�testimony�before�the�US�Congress�that�“several�early�
nanotech�patents�are�given�such�broad�coverage,�the�industry�is�potentially�in�real�danger�of�experiencing�
unnecessary�legal�slowdowns�”�ETC,�“Second�Nature,”�supra note�74�at�p��6��Vaidhyanathan�also�discusses�
the�potential�for�the�nanotechnology�anticommons�to�have�a�“severe�chilling�effect�on�innovation�”�
Vaidhyanathan,�“Nanotechnology�and�the�Law�of�Patents,” supra note�54�at�p��20�
76�� Products�are�not�yet�at�the�stage�of�commercial�application,�so�the�battles�are�not�yet�being�fought��
However,�once�products�do�reach�the�stage�of�commercial�application,�according�to�Matthew�Nordan,�vice-
president�of�research�at�Lux�Research,�“[t]he�fights�are�going�to�be�brutal�”�ETC,�“Second�Nature,”�supra 
note�74�at�p��0�
77�� Matsuura,�Nanotechnology Regulation and Policy Worldwide, supra note�49�at�p��7�
78�� Bawa,�“Will�the�Nanomedicine�‘Patent�Land�Grab’�Thwart�Commercialization?”�supra note�55�at�p��349�
79�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��673�
80�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��673�
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that	of	private	property.”181	There	are	a	variety	of	informal	mechanisms	through	
which	 individuals	can	attempt	to	coordinate	the	use	of	anticommons	property,	
including	cross-licensing	agreements,	patent	pools,	acquisitions	and	exits,	and	
informal	norms.182	These	informal	mechanisms	have	been	successful	in	resolving	
anticommons	 situations	 in	 other	 industries	 (for	 instance,	 the	 semiconductor,	
automobile,	aircraft	manufacturing,	and	synthetic	rubber	industries).183	
There	 are	 reasons	 to	 fear,	 however,	 that	 an	 anticommons	 will	 prove	
more	difficult	to	overcome	in	the	nanotechnology	 industry.	 In	nanotechnology,	
transaction	and	strategic	costs	will	prove	to	be	a	substantial	impediment	to	the	
achievement	of	 informal	 agreements	between	parties.	Due	 to	 transaction	and	
strategic	costs,	alternative	arrangements	such	as	cross-licensing	and	patent	pools	
are	unlikely	to	emerge.184
Transaction	costs,	specifically	the	costs	associated	with	determining	with	
whom	one	must	negotiate	in	order	to	acquire	the	rights	to	a	resource,	will	be	a	
significant	expense	for	any	party	seeking	to	bundle	patents	in	the	nanotechnology	
anticommons.	 These	 costs	 will	 be	 particularly	 high	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 an	
anticommons	situation,	 the	patent	 rights	 to	a	 resource	may	be	overlapping	or	
fragmented	between	multiple	parties.	In	a	situation	where	patent	rights	overlap	
between	two	parties,	persons	seeking	licenses	could	choose	to	negotiate	licenses	
with	both	parties,	knowing	that	one	license	will	later	prove	to	be	unnecessary	after	
patent	 litigation	addresses	 the	overlap.	Alternatively,	persons	 seeking	 licenses	
could	attempt	to	discern	which	patent	will	later	be	invalidated,	negotiating	only	
with	the	party	that	they	believe	will	be	ultimately	successful.	The	former	route	
is	unnecessarily	costly.	The	latter	route	is	risky.	 If	the	person	wishing	to	license	
evaluates	the	patents	incorrectly,	they	could	face	a	patent	infringement	lawsuit.	
The	question	of	with	whom	one	must	negotiate	is	further	complicated	
in	the	case	of	nanotechnology	by	the	fact	that	many	patents	on	nanomaterials	
encompass	basic	research.	The	scope	of	these	patents	may	be	unclear,	making	
it	 difficult	 to	 determine	 exactly	 which	 party	 possesses	 rights	 to	 the	 resource.	
Furthermore,	 as	 nanotechnology	 is	 an	 emerging	 field,	 terminology	 used	
to	 describe	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	 underlying	 science	 may	 be	 ambiguous,	
conflicting,	or	varied.	Difficulties	with	terminology	may	make	it	more	problematic	
to	determine	exactly	with	whom	one	must	negotiate,	as	keyword	searches	of	a	
patent	database	may	not	reveal	all	of	the	patents	covering	a	given	resource.	
In	addition	to	transaction	costs,	three	types	of	bargaining	failures	are	likely	
to	impede	the	achievement	of	informal	licensing	agreements	for	nanotechnology	
patents.	 First,	 the	 nanotechnology	 industry	 is	 not	 structured	 in	 such	 a	way	 as	
to	 facilitate	 informal	 licensing	agreements.	Miller	 states	 that	 informal	 licensing	
arrangements	are:	
	
most	likely	to	arise	when	horizontal	competitors	who	share	similar	values	and	
are	engaged	in	repeat-play	transactions	each	hold	roughly	similar	portfolios	
of	blocking	patents.185	
8�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��673�
82�� Shapiro,�“Navigating�the�Patent�Thicket,” supra note�55��
83�� Heller�and�Eisenberg,�“Can�Patents�Deter�Innovation?”�supra�note�20�at�p��700��
84�� Miller�et al,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology,�supra note�9�at�p��7�
85�� Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology,�supra note�9�at�p��76��
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This	describes	the	semiconductor	industry,	where	informal	agreements	
have	been	successful.	It	does	not,	however,	describe	the	nanotechnology	industry,	
which	 is	 characterized	 by	 parties	 with	 different	 sizes	 and	 agendas,	 operating	
across	a	variety	of	industries.186	Parties	possessing	nanotechnology	patents	may	
not	be	competitors,	could	be	engaged	in	one-off	transactions,	and	hold	different	
intellectual	 property	 portfolios.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 complications	 arising	 from	 the	
structure	of	the	nanotechnology	industry	will	“doom	private	efforts	to	establish	
pooling	arrangements”	in	nanotechnology.187	
Second,	 the	 fact	 that	many	nanotechnology	patents	 encompass	basic	
scientific	research	increases	the	likelihood	of	bargaining	failure.	First,	companies	
may	wish	to	preserve	the	strategic	position	of	their	pioneering	patent.	Second,	
difficulties	 in	patenting	around	nanomaterials	patents	may	cause	patentees	 to	
hold	out	for	greater	licensing	fees.	Third,	valuation	difficulties	with	respect	to	basic	
research	patents	may	make	 it	more	difficult	 for	companies	to	achieve	 informal	
licensing	agreements.	All	three	difficulties	are	accentuated	by	nanotechnology’s	
cross-industry	structure.
Third,	 the	 shift	 in	 scientific	 norms,	 from	 “communalism”	 to	
“commercialism,”	 that	 occurred	 following	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 Bayh-Dole	 Act	
suggests	 that	 patent	 holders	 will	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 grant	 exclusive	 licenses	
rather	 than	broad,	non-exclusive	 licenses.	Lemley	notes	 that	“the	 royalty	 rates	
for	 exclusive	 licenses	 are	 significantly	 higher	 than	 the	 rates	 for	 non-exclusive	
licenses.”188	Exclusive	licenses	are	generally	incompatible	with	informal	licensing	
arrangements	 such	 as	 cross-licensing	 agreements	 between	 multiple	 parties	
or	 patent	 pools.	 The	 ETC	 group	 notes	 that	 between	 2003	 and	 2005,	 twenty	
nanotechnology	 licenses	 were	 publicly	 announced	 by	 universities.189	 Of	 these	
licenses,	“at	least	nineteen	and	perhaps	all	twenty	were	exclusive.”190
Development-oriented	 theorists	 argued	 that	 patenting	 basic	 scientific	
research	will	lead	to	its	efficient	development	and	commercialization.	An	analysis	
of	 the	 nanotechnology	 patent	 landscape	 has	 suggested	 that	 patenting	 basic	
scientific	research	in	nanotechnology	has	led	to	a	nanotechnology	anticommons.	
Though	 the	 mere	 presence	 of	 this	 anticommons	 does	 not	 preclude	 the	
efficient	 development	 and	 commercialization	 of	 nanotechnology	 research,	
an	analysis	of	 the	 transaction	and	 strategic	 costs	associated	with	participation	
in	 the	 nanotechnology	 industry	 indicates	 that	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 rightsholders	
and	prospective	patentees	will	 be	 unable	 to	bundle	 the	multiple	 exclusionary	
rights	 through	 informal	 agreements.	 As	 a	 result,	 unless	 the	 nanotechnology	
anticommons	can	be	overcome	through	non-market	routes,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	
nanotechnology	anticommons	will	turn	tragic,	causing	slowdowns	in	innovation.	
A	 significant	 disparity	 thus	 exists	 between	 the	 assumptions	 of	 the	
development-oriented	approach	and	 the	 reality	of	 the	nanotechnology	patent	
landscape.	The	disparity	between	theory	and	reality,	in	the	case	of	nanotechnology,	
is	caused	by	the	failure	of	the	development-oriented	approach	to	account	for	the	
86�� Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology,�supra note�9�at�p��76�
87�� Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note�9�at�p��8�
88�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�pp��626–627�
89�� ETC,�“Second�Nature,”�supra note�74�at�p��4,�cited�in�Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�
0�at�p��627�
90�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�p��627,�citing�ETC,�“Second�Nature,”�supra note�74�
at�p��4�
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transaction	and	strategic	costs	involved	in	licensing	nanomaterials	patents.	Kitch	
himself,	in	a	more	recent	work,	states	that	the	“failure	to	consider	the	importance	
of	licensing,	transfer,	and	other	transactions	by	which	intellectual	property	rights	
are	shared”	is	an	“elementary	and	persistent”	error	in	the	economic	analysis	of	
intellectual	property.191	He	states	that:
	
the	ability	of	the	owners	of	intellectual	property	rights	to	transfer	these	rights	
in	whole	or	in	part	to	others	is	an	important	feature	of	the	systems.	The	rights	
can	 easily	 arise	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 persons	 or	 firms	 who	 are	 not	 in	 the	 best	
position	to	exploit	them.	In	order	to	involve	others	in	the	full	exploitation	of	
the	economic	potential	of	the	right,	the	owners	must	be	able	to	enter	into	a	
wide	range	of	arrangements	with	other	firms.192
In	nanotechnology,	the	full	exploitation	of	the	economic	potential	of	nanomaterials	
is	limited	by	the	inability	(and,	in	certain	situations,	unwillingness)	of	owners	to	
enter	into	arrangements	with	other	firms.	In	this	article,	I	am	not	taking	the	position	
that	the	development-oriented	approach	should	be	abandoned.	Where	licensing	
costs	are	not	an	issue,	early	patenting	may	lead	to	the	efficient	development	and	
commercialization	of	 research.	 In	 the	case	of	nanotechnology,	however,	unless	
non-market	routes	are	successful	at	bundling	the	anticommons,	broad	patenting	
of	 basic	 research	 in	 nanotechnology	 is	 likely	 to	 hinder	 the	 development	 and	
commercialization	of	nanomaterials.
	
		
*
7. USING NON-MARKET SOLUTIONS TO OVERCOME THE ANTICOMMONS
ThE sEcond main way To ovErcomE ThE anTicommons	is	through	legislative	
or	 judicial	 intervention	 to	 redefine,	 remove,	 or	 reallocate	 property	 rights.193	
These	 forms	 of	 intervention	 will	 be	 grouped	 under	 the	 heading	 “non-market	
solutions.”	There	are	a	variety	of	non-market	solutions	that	can	be	adopted	to	
overcome	the	tragedy	of	the	anticommons	in	nanotechnology	in	the	US.	These	
solutions	 include	 Barzel’s	 grant/auction	 approach,	 compulsory	 licensing,	
compelling	licensing	under	the	Bayh-Dole	Act,	the	formation	of	a	government-
sponsored	patent	pool,	the	creation	of	a	broad	experimental	use	exception,	and	
a	modification	of	 the	utility	 requirement.	 In	 this	Part,	 I	will	 focus	on	one	non-
market	solution	to	the	problems	posed	by	the	tragedy	of	 the	anticommons	 in	
nanotechnology	in	the	US,	namely	the	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement.		
7.1. Adoption of a Strict Utility Requirement
This	section	will	proceed	in	three	parts.	First,	it	will	describe	the	utility	requirement	
as	 it	 has	been	 interpreted	 in	US	 law.	 In	 the	 context	of	 scientific	 research,	 the	
utility	requirement	has	fluctuated	between	a	weak	and	a	strict	utility	requirement.	
9�� Edmund�W�Kitch,�“Elementary�and�Persistent�Errors�in�the�Economic�Analysis�of�Intellectual�Property,”�
(2000)�53:6�Vanderbilt Law Review�727–74�at�p��739�
92�� Kitch,�“Elementary�and�Persistent�Errors,”�supra note�9�at�p��740�
93�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20�at�p��64�
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Second,	 this	section	will	argue	that	 the	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	 requirement	
is	particularly	suited	as	a	solution	to	the	problems	posed	by	the	tragedy	of	the	
anticommons	in	nanotechnology.	I	will	also	demonstrate	the	effect	that	a	strict	
utility	requirement	would	have	on	the	nanotechnology	anticommons	in	the	US.	
Third,	 this	 section	 will	 argue	 that	 US	 courts	 are	 likely	 to	 adopt	 a	 strict	 utility	
requirement	for	nanotechnology	inventions	over	a	weak	utility	requirement.	
7.1.1.	The	Utility	Requirement	in	US	Law
The	utility	 requirement	 is	one	of	 the	essential	 requirements	of	patentability.	 It	
stipulates	that	an	individual	may	patent	only	“useful”	inventions.	In	the	US,	the	
utility	requirement	is	grounded	in	the	constitutional	limitation	of	patent	protection	
to	the	“useful	arts.”194	The	utility	requirement	has	had	a	central	place	in	US	patent	
legislation	since	the	first	patent	law	in	1790.195	It	is	currently	dealt	with	in	Chapter	
10,	Title	35	of	the	US	Code,	section	101,	where	it	is	stated	that:
whoever	 invents	 or	 discovers	 any	 new	 and	 useful	 process,	 machine,	
manufacture,	or	composition	of	matter,	or	any	new	and	useful	improvement	
thereof,	 may	 obtain	 a	 patent	 therefor,	 subject	 to	 the	 conditions	 and	
requirements	of	this	title.196
In	 the	 US,	 utility	 is	 generally	 not	 an	 issue	 when	 dealing	 with	 the	
patentability	 of	mechanical	 inventions.197	 However,	 utility	 has	 reemerged	 as	 a	
controversial	 issue	 in	US	patent	 law	 in	 fields	 involving	 scientific	 research.198	 In	
the	context	of	scientific	research,	the	utility	requirement	in	the	US	has	fluctuated	
between	two	standards,	a	weak	utility	requirement	and	a	strict	utility	requirement.	
Each	standard	is	supported	by	a	line	of	precedents	and	by	a	theory	of	intellectual	
property	law.	The	first	standard	represents	a	weak	utility	requirement.	
7.1.1.1.	Weak	Utility	Requirement
Echoing	 the	 arguments	 of	 prospect	 theory	 and	 the	 development-oriented	
approach,	individuals	advocating	for	a	weak	utility	requirement	argue	that	patents	
should	be	granted	early	in	the	research	process	in	order	to	provide	an	“incentive	
for	private	firms	 to	undertake	 the	 further	 investment	necessary	 to	 translate	 the	
inventions	 into	 marketable	 products.”199	 Thus,	 although	 the	 invention	 may	 not	
demonstrate	any	practical	utility,	patents	should	be	granted	in	order	to	ensure	that	
persons	will	continue	to	develop	the	research	prospect.	To	advocates	of	a	weak	
utility	requirement,	granting	patents	in	basic	research	is	the	most	efficient	way	to	
develop	and	commercialize	 research.	Consistent	with	prospect	 theory,	 licensing	
concerns	do	not	appear	to	be	an	issue	to	advocates	of	the	weak	utility	requirement.
94�� Brenner v Manson,�(USA�SC,�966),�<http://supreme�vlex�com/vid/brenner-v-manson-9992706>,�383�United 
States Reports 59�[Brenner�cited�to�United States Reports]�
95�� Brenner,�supra note�94�at�p��529�
96�� Patent Act�(USA), “Inventions�Patentable,”�(996)�35�United States Code sec��0�(emphasis�added),�
<http://www�uspto�gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxl_35_U_S_C_0�htm#usc35s0>��
97�� Georgios�I�Zekos,�“Utility�and�Biotechnology�Patenting,”�(2006)�5�Web Journal of Current Legal Issues,�
<http://webjcli�ncl�ac�uk/2006/issue5/zekos5�html>�
98�� Zekos,�“Utility�and�Biotechnology�Patenting,”�supra note�97�
99�� Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research,”�supra note�2�at�p��96�
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The	historical	origin	of	the	weak	utility	requirement	 is	found	in	Justice	
Story’s	judgment	in	Lowell	v	Lewis,	an	1817	decision	of	the	District	Circuit	Court	
of	Massachusetts.200	In	this	decision,	Justice	Story	adopts	a	de	minimis	view	of	the	
utility	requirement,	stating	that	a	useful	invention	is	one	“which	may	be	applied	
to	a	beneficial	use	in	society,	in	contradistinction	to	an	invention	injurious	to	the	
morals,	health,	or	good	order	of	society,	or	frivolous	and	insignificant.”201	In	the	
broadest	sense	of	this	definition,	“little	or	nothing	is	wholly	beyond	the	pale	of	
‘utility.’”202	In	Lowell,	Justice	Story	was	not	contemplating	the	utility	requirement	as	
it	applies	to	scientific	research.	Rather,	Lowell	dealt	with	a	purported	improvement	
of	a	pump	invention.	Even	though	Justice	Story	was	not	contemplating	scientific	
research	when	he	set	out	his	view	of	the	utility	requirement,	however,	advocates	
of	early	patentability	of	scientific	research	have	continued	to	cite	Justice	Story’s	
de	minimis	view	of	the	utility	requirement	as	support	for	their	position.203	They	
have	done	so	on	the	basis	that	it	provides	an	established	judicial	precedent	for	
development-oriented	theory’s	contention	that	patents	should	be	granted	at	an	
early	phase	in	the	research	process.
7.1.1.2.	Strict	Utility	Requirement
The	second	standard	represents	a	strict	utility	requirement.	Advocates	of	a	strict	
utility	requirement	take	a	less	optimistic	view	of	the	ability	of	patents	to	support	
innovation.	While	recognizing	the	need	to	provide	incentives	for	research,	they	
state	that	in	certain	circumstances,	granting	patents	for	basic	research	will	stifle	
rather	than	support	 innovation.	Patents	can	stifle	innovation	in	two	main	ways.	
First,	a	broad	patent	encompassing	basic	research	may	allow	a	company	to	block	
off	an	entire	area	of	scientific	development.	Second,	granting	patents	for	basic	
research	may	result	in	the	creation	of	an	anticommons.	If	individuals	are	unable	
to	bundle	the	multiple	exclusionary	rights	 in	the	anticommons,	 innovation	may	
be	stifled.	As	a	result,	 in	order	to	guard	against	 those	situations	where	patent	
protection	 stifles	 rather	 than	 supports	 innovation,	 advocates	 of	 a	 strict	 utility	
requirement	argue	for	more	limited	patent	protection.
Brenner	 v	 Manson	 is	 the	 representative	 case	 for	 the	 strict	 utility	
model.204		It	“represents	the	high-water	mark”	of	the	strict	utility	requirement.205	
It	is	also	the	leading	United	States	Supreme	Court	decision	on	utility.	Brenner	
addresses	 the	 applicants’	 patent	 application	 for	 an	 “allegedly	 novel	 process	
for	making	certain	known	steroids.”206	Three	years	after	the	applicants’	patent	
application,	 the	 respondent	Manson	 filed	 an	 application	 to	 patent	 the	 same	
process,	asserting	that	he	had	discovered	the	process	and	claiming	an	earlier	
filing	 date	 than	 that	 of	 the	 applicants.207	 A	 Patent	 Office	 examiner	 denied	
Manson’s	 application	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 failed	 to	 disclose	 any	 utility	 for	
200�� Lowell v Lewis (USA�Cir�Ct�Mass,�87), 5�Federal Cases�08���
20�� Lowell,�supra note�200,�cited�in�Brenner supra note�94�at�p��533���
202�� Brenner, supra note�94�at�p��530�
203�� Lowell is�cited�in�decisions�addressing�the�utility�of�scientific�research�up�to�and�including�the�most�recent�
decision�by�CAFC�on�the�utility�requirement:�In re�Fisher�(USA�Fed�Cir,�2005),�<http://www�cafc�uscourts�
gov/opinions/04-465�pdf>,�42�Federal Reporter 3d ser. 365�
204�� Brenner, supra note�94�at�p��520�
205�� Robert�P�Merges,�Peter�S�Menell�and�Mark�A�Lemley,�Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age,�
3d�ed��(Aspen,�2003)�at�p��4;�Almeling,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�66�at�para��20�
206�� Brenner, supra note�94�at�p��59��
207�� Brenner, supra note�94�at�pp��520–52��
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the	chemical	compound	produced	by	the	process.208	This	denial	was	affirmed	
by	 the	Board	of	Appeals	within	 the	Patent	Office,	but	was	 later	 reversed	by	
the	Court	of	Customs	and	Patent	Appeals	(CCPA)	on	the	basis	that	the	utility	
requirement	applied	by	the	examiner	was	too	strict.	Instead,	the	CCPA	applied	
Justice	Story’s	de	minimis	view	of	the	utility	requirement.	
The	 CCPA’s	 decision	 was	 reversed	 by	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court,	 which	
rejected	Justice	Story’s	view	of	 the	utility	 requirement.209	According	 to	Justice	
Fortas	 (who	 delivered	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 Court),	 Justice	 Story’s	 view	 “sheds	
little	 light	 on	 our	 subject.”210	 A	 narrow	 reading	 of	 Justice	 Story’s	 view	 forces	
the	 adjudicator	 into	 determining	 whether	 the	 invention	 is	 “frivolous	 and	
insignificant.”211	 Justice	 Fortas	 states	 that	 this	 term	 gives	 no	 more	 guidance	
than	the	term	“useful”	 itself.212	 	Justice	Fortas	also	notes	that	a	broad	reading	
of	Justice	Story’s	view	would	allow	the	patenting	“of	any	invention	not	positively	
harmful	 to	 society.”213	 This	 interpretation	of	 “useful”	would	 strip	 the	 standard	
of	any	meaning,	as	virtually	all	 inventions	would	satisfy	this	utility	requirement.	
Justice	Fortas	states,	correctly,	that	such	an	interpretation	cannot	be	accepted	in	
the	“absence	of	evidence	that	Congress	so	intended.”214
Justice	 Fortas	 further	 states	 that	 one	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 patent	
system	is	to	“encourage	dissemination	of	information	concerning	discoveries	and	
inventions,”	and	recognizes	that	a	strict	utility	requirement	would	“to	some	extent	
[discourage]	disclosure	and	[lead]	to	greater	secrecy	than	would	otherwise	be	the	
case.”215	 	Demonstrating	a	certain	cynicism	towards	patentees,	however,	Justice	
Fortas	takes	the	position	that	the	benefits	flowing	from	early	patenting	with	respect	
to	the	increased	dissemination	of	information	are	more	exaggerated	than	real.216	
He	notes	that	patentees	frequently	attempt	to	disclose	as	little	useful	information	
as	possible	while	broadening	the	scope	of	their	claim	as	widely	as	possible.217		In	
a	similar	manner,	the	Court	takes	a	skeptical	view	of	the	importance	of	patents	in	
reducing	secrecy,	stating	that	if	a	process	inventor	cannot	discern	a	product,	he	has	
“every	incentive	to	make	his	invention	known	to	those	able	to	do	so.”218	
Having	 minimized	 the	 potential	 positive	 effects	 of	 early	 patenting,	
Justice	Fortas	takes	the	position	that	a	“more	compelling	consideration”	is	the	
negative	 impact	 of	 early	 patenting	on	 scientific	 development.219	According	 to	
the	Court,	granting	patents	before	a	process	or	product	has	been	developed	to	
a	degree	of	specific	and	substantial	utility	“creates	a	monopoly	of	knowledge”	
which	 “may	 engross	 a	 vast,	 unknown,	 and	 perhaps	 unknowable	 area.”220	 The	
Court	states	that	“[s]uch	a	patent	may	confer	power	to	block	off	whole	areas	of	
scientific	development,	without	compensating	benefit	to	the	public,”	and	should	
208�� Brenner, supra note�94�at�p��52�
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be	granted	“only	if	clearly	commanded	by	the	statute.”221
While	affirming	the	value	of	contributions	short	of	something	“useful”	to	
“the	fund	of	scientific	information,”	Justice	Fortas	rejects	the	idea	that	a	patent	
should	be	used	to	reward	such	a	contribution.222	In	an	oft-quoted	passage,	Justice	
Fortas	states	that:	
	
a	 patent	 is	 not	 a	 hunting	 license.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 reward	 for	 the	 search,	 but	
compensation	for	its	successful	conclusion.	[A]	patent	system	must	be	related	
to	the	world	of	commerce	rather	than	the	realm	of	philosophy.223	
The	phrase	“world	of	commerce”	seems	 to	 imply	 that	patents	 should	
not	be	granted	until	the	invention	reaches	the	point	of	commercial	applicability.	
Both	the	reference	to	a	patent	as	compensation	for	a	“successful	conclusion”	and	
the	rejection	of	the	concept	of	a	patent	as	a	“reward	for	the	search”	imply	that	
patents	should	not	be	granted	until	the	end	of	the	research	process.
Both	In	re	Joly	and	In	re	Kirk,	decided	the	year	after	Brenner,	affirmed	
Brenner	in	adopting	a	strict	utility	requirement.224	Dissenting	judges	in	both	cases,	
however,	continued	to	advocate	for	a	weak	utility	requirement	based	on	concerns	
that	denying	patent	protection	will	harm	future	 research	and	 innovation.	After	
Kirk	 and	 Joly,	 the	 CCPA	 permitted	 the	weak	 utility	 requirement	 to	 reemerge	
as	 the	 dominant	 view	 of	 the	 utility	 requirement	 in	 US	 patent	 law.225	 It	 did	 so	
in	part	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 concerns	of	 researchers	 that	patent	protection	 is	
necessary	 in	 order	 to	 progress	 efficiently	 from	 research	 to	 products	 ready	 for	
commercialization.226
The	high-water	mark	of	the	weak	utility	requirement	in	the	modern	era	
occurred	in	1995,	with	the	decision	of	the	CAFC	in	In	re	Brana	and	the	passage	
of	the	1995	USPTO	Utility	Examination	Guidelines.227	In	Brana,	the	CAFC	noted	that	
“usefulness	 in	 patent	 law,	 and	 in	particular	 in	 the	 context	 of	 pharmaceutical	
inventions,	 necessarily	 includes	 the	 expectation	 of	 further	 research	 and	
development.”228	 In	 1995,	 a	 set	 of	USPTO	Utility	 Examination	Guidelines	 was	
released.229	These	guidelines	are	to	be	used	by	USPTO	personnel	in	their	review	of	
patent	applications	for	compliance	with	the	“utility	requirement.”230	These	guidelines	
echoed	Brana	in	adopting	a	weak	standard	of	utility.	According	to	the	guidelines:
if	 the	 applicant	 has	 asserted	 that	 the	 claimed	 invention	 is	 useful	 for	 any	
particular	 purpose	 (i.e.,	 a	 “specific	 utility”)	 and	 that	 assertion	 would	 be	 	
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225�� Salim�A�Hasan,�“A�Call�for�Reconsideration�of�the�Strict�Utility�requirement�in�Chemical�Patent�Practice,”�(994)�
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229�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 1995,�supra note�227�
230�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 1995,�supra note�227�
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considered	credible	by	a	person	of	ordinary	skill	in	the	art,	[an	officer	should	
not…]	impose	a	rejection	based	on	lack	of	utility.231
Following	 the	 decision	 in	 Brana	 and	 the	 issuance	 of	 the	 1995	 PTO	
guidelines,	 concerns	 began	 to	 grow	 regarding	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 early	
patenting.	One	expression	of	these	concerns	is	found	in	Heller	and	Eisenberg’s	
work	on	anticommons	 theory,	published	 in	1998.232	The	USPTO	 responded	 to	
concerns	regarding	the	negative	effects	of	patenting	basic	research	on	5	January	
2001,	with	the	release	of	a	new	set	of	Utility	Examination	Guidelines.233	These	
guidelines	call	 for	a	more	stringent	utility	 requirement	to	be	applied	 in	patent	
decisions.234	 Incorporated	into	the	Manual	of	Patent	Examining	Procedure,	the	
2001	 guidelines	 state	 that	 in	 order	 for	 the	 utility	 requirement	 to	 be	 satisfied,	
there	must	 be	 a	 “specific,	 substantial,	 [and]	 credible	 utility.”235	 Specific	 utility	
is	 “particular	 to	 the	 subject	matter	 claimed	and	would	not	be	applicable	 to	a	
broad	 class	 of	 invention.”236	 The	 Utility	 Guidelines	 “explain	 that	 a	 substantial	
utility	defines	a	‘real	world’	use.”237	The	guidelines	quote	various	statements	from	
Brenner,	including	the	statement	that	“a	patent	is	not	a	hunting	license.	It	is	not	a	
reward	for	the	search,	but	compensation	for	its	successful	conclusion.”238	
In	re	Fisher,	a	2005	CAFC	decision,	 is	the	most	recent	decision	of	the	
CAFC	 to	 address	 the	 utility	 requirement.239	 Fisher	 reaffirms	 the	 strict	 utility	
requirement	 as	 established	 in	 Brenner,	 adopts	 the	 2001	 utility	 examination	
guidelines,	 and	 articulates	 definitions	 for	 “specific”	 and	 “substantial”	 utility.	
The	claimed	invention	in	Fisher	relates	to	“five	purified	nucleic	acid	sequences	
that	encode	proteins	and	protein	fragments	in	maize	plants.”240	These	claimed	
sequences	are	commonly	referred	to	as	“expressed	sequence	tags”	or	“ESTs.”241	
ESTs	have	been	described	as	representing:
	
one	 discrete	 portion	 of	 a	 larger	 gene,	 and	 are	 most	 often	 marketed	 by	
biotechnology	companies	as	tools	for	investigating	parts	of	the	genome	that	
are	active	in	producing	proteins.	Patents	are	often	sought	for	ESTs	before	any	
function	is	known	beyond	their	significance	for	further	research.242
The	examiner,	finding	that	the	claims	were	not	supported	by	a	specific	
and	 substantial	 utility,	 rejected	 them	 for	 lack	 of	 utility.243	 The	 Board	 affirmed	
the	 examiner’s	 rejection	 of	 the	 application	 for	 lack	 of	 utility.244	 Asserting	 that	
23�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 1995, supra note�227�at�s��IIB�2a�
232�� Heller,�“The�Tragedy�of�the�Anticommons,”�supra�note�20;�Heller�and�Eisenberg,�“Can�Patents�Deter�
Innovation?”�supra note�20;�Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology,�supra note�9�
233�� Patent�and�Trademark�Office,�Utility Examination Guidelines (Patent�and�Trademark�Office,�200),�
<http://www�uspto�gov/go/og/200/week05/patutil�htm>�[USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001]. 
234�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233��
235�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�at�sec��I()�
236�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��372;�USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�
237�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��372;�USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�at�s��I(4)�
238�� Brenner, supra note�94�at�p��536;�USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�at�s��I(23)�
239�� Fisher,�supra note�203�
240�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��367��
24�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��367��
242�� Julian�David�Forman,�“A�Timing�Perspective�on�the�Utility�Requirement�in�Biotechnology�Patent�
Applications,”�(2002)�2�Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology�647–682�at�p��655�
243�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��368��
244�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�pp��368–369��
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the	Board	applied	a	heightened	standard	for	utility	 in	 the	case	of	ESTs,	Fisher	
appealed	 to	 the	 CAFC,	 contending	 that	 section	 101	 demands	 a	 standard	 no	
higher	than	Justice	Story’s	view	of	utility.245
In	Fisher,	the	government	was	supported	by	various	academic	institutions	
and	 biotechnology	 and	 pharmaceutical	 companies,	 writing	 as	 amici	 curiae.246	
These	groups	“assert	that	Fisher’s	claimed	uses	are	nothing	more	than	a	‘laundry	
list’	of	 research	plans.”247	They	are	general,	 speculative,	and	do	not	provide	a	
“specific	and	substantial	benefit	in	currently	available	form.”248	
	 As	 did	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 Brenner,	 the	 CAFC	 in	 Fisher	 rejects	
Justice	Story’s	de	minimis	view	of	utility,	adopting	a	strict	utility	requirement.249	
Chief	 Judge	Michel,	 writing	 for	 the	 court,	 notes	 that	 “following	Brenner,	our	
predecessor	court	[the	CCPA],	and	this	court	have	required	a	claimed	invention	
to	have	a	specific	and	substantial	utility	to	satisfy	section	101.”250	This	utility	 is	
also	referred	to	as	practical	utility,	which	is	synonymous	with	attributing	“‘real-
world’	value	to	claimed	subject	manner.”251	In	other	words,	the	discovery	must	
provide	some	“immediate	benefit	to	the	public.”252
	 Chief	Justice	Michel	notes	that	a	specific	utility	 is	specific	to	the	subject	
matter	 claimed	 and	 can	 “provide	 a	well-defined	 and	 particular	 benefit	 to	 the	
public.”253	This	contrasts	with	a	general	utility	that	is	applicable	to	a	broad	class	
of	invention.	Chief	Judge	Michel	also	notes	that	for	an	invention	to	have	specific	
utility,	its	use	must	not	be	“so	vague	as	to	be	meaningless.”254
Chief	 Judge	 Michel	 then	 proceeds	 to	 define	 “substantial	 utility.”	
According	to	Chief	Judge	Michel,	substantial	utility	“defines	a	‘real	world’	use.”255	
Utilities	 that	 “require	or	 constitute	 carrying	out	 further	 research	 to	 identify	 or	
reasonably	confirm	a	‘real	world’	context	of	use	are	not	substantial	utilities.”256	
As	noted	in	Fisher:
	
[A]n	 application	 must	 show	 that	 an	 invention	 is	 useful	 to	 the	 public	 as	
disclosed	in	its	current	form,	not	that	it	may	prove	useful	at	some	future	date	
after	 further	 research.	 Simply	 put,	 to	 satisfy	 the	 “substantial”	 utility	
requirement,	 an	 asserted	 use	must	 show	 that	 the	 claimed	 invention	 has	 a	
significant	and	presently	available	benefit	to	the	public.257	
Chief	Judge	Michel	specifically	notes	the	concerns	by	government	and	
its	 amici	 that	 “allowing	EST	patents	without	proof	of	 utility	would	discourage	
research,	delay	scientific	discovery,	and	thwart	progress	in	the	‘useful	Arts’	and	
‘Science.’”258	Furthermore,	it	could	give	rise	to	multiple	patents	relating	to	the	
245�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�pp��369–370��
246�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��370��
247�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��370��
248�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��370��
249�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�pp��370–37��
250�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
25�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
252�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
253�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
254�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
255�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�at�s��I(4)�
256�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��372��
257�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
258�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��378��
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same	 gene	 and	 create	 an	 unnecessarily	 convoluted	 licensing	 environment.259	
Rather	than	explicitly	making	his	decision	on	these	policy	grounds,	however,	Chief	
Judge	Michel	notes	that	these	considerations	are	more	appropriately	directed	to	
Congress.260	Instead,	Chief	Judge	Michel	bases	his	decision	on	past	precedent.	
By	citing	passages	from	Brenner	which	focus	on	the	dangers	of	locking	up	vast	
unknowable	areas	of	research,	however,	Chief	Judge	Michel	implicitly	addresses	
the	policy	concerns	of	anticommons	theorists.
7.1.2.	The	Adoption	of	a	Strict	Utility	Requirement	is	Particularly	Suited	as	a	
Solution	to	the	Tragedy	of	the	Anticommons
The	 nanotechnology	 anticommons	 emerged	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 broad	
patenting	 of	 nanomaterials.	 A	 solution	 to	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anticommons	 in	
nanotechnology,	 therefore,	can	be	achieved	by	 removing	property	 rights	 from	
nanomaterials.	The	utility	requirement	is	particularly	suited	to	effect	this	change.	
Many	of	 the	patents	making	up	 the	nanotechnology	anticommons	encompass	
basic	 research.	 These	 patents	 were	 granted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 weak	 utility	
requirement.	They	would	not	have	been	granted	under	a	strict	utility	requirement.	
The	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	for	nanotechnology	inventions	will	shift	
patents	away	from	basic	scientific	research	in	nanomaterials	towards	the	practical	
application	 of	 nanomaterials.261	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 of	 the	 broad,	 overlapping	
patents	in	the	nanotechnology	anticommons	will	be	invalidated.	
The	adoption	of	a	 strict	utility	 requirement	 is	not	a	complete	solution	
to	the	problems	posed	by	the	tragedy	of	the	anticommons	in	nanotechnology.	
Many	 patents	 on	 nanomaterials	 would,	 in	 all	 probability,	 satisfy	 the	 elevated	
utility	 requirement	 while	 still	 having	 sufficient	 breadth	 to	 be	 considered	 part	
of	the	nanotechnology	anticommons.	Nevertheless,	the	elimination	of	multiple	
exclusionary	rights	from	the	nanotechnology	anticommons	makes	it	more	likely	
that	users	will	be	able	to	bundle	the	remaining	nanomaterial	patent	fragments	
through	 informal	 licensing	agreements.	Consequently,	 the	adoption	of	 a	 strict	
utility	requirement	makes	it	less	likely	that	the	nanotechnology	anticommons	will	
turn	tragic.	This	part	will	proceed	by	evaluating	the	effects	of	the	weak	and	strict	
utility	requirements	on	the	nanotechnology	anticommons.
7.1.2.1.	Effects	of	the	Various	Utility	Requirements	on	the	Nanotechnology	
Anticommons
7.1.2.1.1.	Weak	Utility	Requirement
The	 adoption	 of	 a	 weak	 utility	 requirement	 would	 perpetuate	 the	 existing	
nanotechnology	anticommons	by	permitting	further	patenting	of	basic	scientific	
research	in	nanotechnology.
	
	
	
259�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��378�
260�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��378��
26�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�p��628��
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7.1.2.1.2.	Strict	Utility	Requirement
The	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	would	play	a	positive	role	in	ensuring	
that	the	nanotechnology	anticommons	does	not	turn	tragic.	As	noted	above,	
as	held	 in	Brenner	and	affirmed	 in	both	 the	2001	USPTO	Utility	Examination	
Guidelines	and	Fisher,	inventions	will	be	considered	to	be	useful	in	the	US	under	
a	strict	utility	requirement	if	they	provide	a	“specific,	substantial	and	credible	
utility.”262	 The	 adoption	 of	 a	 strict	 utility	 requirement	 for	 nanotechnology	
inventions	 would	 invalidate	 those	 patents	 that	 do	 not	 disclose	 a	 specific,	
substantial,	and	credible	utility.	This	would	have	the	effect	of	removing	various	
rights	 of	 exclusion	 from	 the	 anticommons.	 In	 addition	 to	 weakening	 the	
anticommons,	the	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	would	also	have	the	
effect	of	 reducing	 transaction	 and	 strategic	 costs,	making	 it	more	 likely	 that	
users	would	be	able	to	bundle	the	remaining	rights	in	the	anticommons.
The	adoption	of	a	 strict	utility	 standard	would	 invalidate	a	 substantial	
number	of	nanomaterial	patents.	For	example,	US	patent	5,424,054	is	one	patent	
that	would,	 in	all	 likelihood,	be	invalidated	under	a	strict	utility	requirement.	 It	
claims	“a	hollow	carbon	fiber	wall	consisting	essentially	of	a	single	layer	of	carbon	
atoms”	(a	carbon	nanotube).	In	terms	of	utility,	the	patent	application	states	that:
	
These	single	atomic	layer	fibers	could	be	used	to	assemble	structures	with	low	
density	 and	 high	 surface	 to	 volume	 ratios,	 wires	 with	 extremely	 small	
diameters	and	solids	with	highly	anisotropic	properties.	They	also	could	be	
semiconducting	or	metallic	depending	on	their	helicity.	These	single	atomic		
layer	fibers	could	be	used	directly	in	assemblies	or	structures,	or	could	serve	
as	uniform	“seed”	substrates	for	growth	of	larger	ordered	structures.263
The	application	above	demonstrates	neither	specific	nor	substantial	utility,	and	
would	likely	fail	to	meet	the	“strict”	utility	standard.	
	 As	noted	in	Fisher,	in	order	to	satisfy	the	“specific”	utility	requirement,	
“an	application	must	disclose	a	use	which	is	not	so	vague	as	to	be	meaningless.”264	
The	 asserted	 use	must	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 “claimed	 invention	 can	 be	 used	
to	provide	a	well-defined	and	particular	benefit	to	the	public.”265	According	to	
the	 2001	 USPTO	 Utility	 Examination	 Guidelines,	 a	 specific	 utility	 is	 particular	
to	the	subject	matter	claimed	and	would	not	be	applicable	to	a	broad	class	of	
invention.266	
	 A	court	could	interpret	the	application	above	as	being	“so	vague	as	to	
be	meaningless.”	The	application	refers	to	“structures	with	low	density	and	high	
surface	 to	 volume	 ratios”	without	 describing	 these	 structures	 in	 detail.	 In	 the	
same	way,	it	refers	to	“wires	with	extremely	small	diameters,”	“solids	with	highly	
anisotropic	 properties,”	 assemblies	 and	 structures.	 These	 vague	 references	 to	
larger	order	structures	provide	little	to	no	specificity.	Furthermore,	the	application	
is	 not	 “particular	 to	 the	 subject	matter	 claimed.”	 Rather,	 it	 is	 applicable	 to	 a	
262�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�at�s��I();�Brenner,�supra note�94;�Fisher,�supra	
note�203�
263�� Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology�supra note�9�at�pp��69–70��
264�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
265�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
266�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�
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broad	class	of	invention.	It	could	be	said	that	the	description	could	apply	to	any	
carbon	fiber,	not	simply	one	with	a	single	layer	of	carbon	atoms.	This	invention	
thus	provides	neither	a	well-defined	nor	particular	benefit.
In	a	similar	manner,	the	application	could	fail	to	satisfy	the	“substantial”	
utility	 requirement.	 As	 noted	 in	 Fisher,	 the	 substantial	 utility	 requirement	
demands	“practical	utility”	and	“real	world”	utility.267	The	invention	must	provide	
some	“immediate	benefit”	or	a	“presently	available	benefit”	to	the	public.268	As	
noted	by	the	USPTO	and	in	Fisher,	the	application	must	show	that	an	“invention	
is	useful	to	the	public	as	disclosed	in	its	current	form,	not	that	it	may	prove	useful	
at	some	future	date	after	further	research.”269
If	 the	 words	 “immediate	 benefit”	 and	 “presently	 available”	 are	
interpreted	strictly,	the	fact	that	the	application	only	discloses	potential	utilities	
would	mean	that	it	will	likely	fail	the	substantial	utility	requirement.	In	the	case	
of	 the	 patent	 noted	 above,	 further	 research	 is	 required	 to	 confirm	 real	world	
contexts	of	 use.	The	application	also	 seems	 to	 fall	 under	one	of	 the	USPTO’s	
enumerated	situations	in	which	no	substantial	utility	is	found,	namely,	a	claim	to	
an	intermediate	product	for	use	in	making	a	final	product	that	has	no	specific,	
substantial	 and	 credible	 utility.270	 The	 structures	 and	 wires	 discussed	 in	 the	
application	are	not	identified.	As	a	result,	they	are	not	“specific.”	Therefore,	under	
the	USPTO’s	2001	guidelines,	the	patent	would	likely	fail	the	utility	requirement.
The	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	 is	not	a	complete	solution,	
however,	 to	 the	 problems	 posed	 by	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anticommons	 in	
nanotechnology.	 Many	 patents	 on	 nanomaterials	 would,	 in	 all	 probability,	
satisfy	the	elevated	utility	requirement	while	still	having	sufficient	breadth	to	be	
considered	 part	 of	 the	 nanotechnology	 anticommons.	 However,	 the	 adoption	
of	 a	 strict	 utility	 requirement	would	 substantially	 weaken	 the	 nanotechnology	
anticommons.	 In	 addition	 to	 weakening	 the	 anticommons,	 a	 strict	 utility	
requirement	 will	 also	 reduce	 transaction	 and	 strategic	 costs	 with	 respect	 to	
patents	on	nanomaterials,	making	it	more	likely	that	patentees	and	licensees	will	
be	able	to	reach	informal	agreements	to	bundle	the	remaining	exclusionary	rights	
through	informal	market	mechanisms.	
The	 application	 of	 a	 strict	 utility	 requirement	 for	 nanotechnology	
inventions	will	reduce	transaction	costs	in	three	main	ways.	First,	costly	negotiations	
will	 not	 have	 to	be	 conducted	with	 those	patent	 holders	whose	patents	 have	
become	invalidated	as	a	result	of	the	strengthened	utility	requirement.	Second,	
the	elevated	utility	requirement	may	also	make	it	easier	for	a	potential	licensee	
to	determine	exactly	which	patents	 she	needs	 to	pursue	 in	 seeking	 to	 license	
a	nanomaterial.	It	is	likely	that	many	patents	that	do	not	satisfy	the	strict	utility	
requirement	will	 have	been	granted	earlier	 in	 nanotechnology’s	development.	
As	terminology	was	less	settled	in	the	early	phases	of	nanotechnology	research,	
these	 patents	 may	 have	 been	 described,	 in	 patent	 applications,	 in	 ways	 that	
would	cause	them	to	go	undetected	in	routine	patent	searches.	Third,	it	may	be	
easier	to	negotiate	informal	licensing	agreements	once	a	significant	number	of	
nanomaterial	patents	are	purged	through	the	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	standard.	
267�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
268�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37��
269�� Fisher,�supra note�203�at�p��37;�USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�
270�� USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233�
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Strategic	costs	can	be	reduced	in	two	main	ways.	First,	the	application	of	
a	strict	utility	requirement	should	reduce	valuation	difficulties	in	nanotechnology	
patents.	Those	patents	that	fail	the	strict	utility	test	are	likely	to	be	vague	and	
broad.	 It	 is	 more	 difficult	 to	 quantify	 the	 value	 of	 these	 patents	 than	 those	
that	demonstrate	a	 specific	 and	 substantial	 utility.	Patents	 that	demonstrate	a	
substantial	and	specific	utility	are	closer	to	commercial	application	than	patents	
for	basic	 research.	As	a	result,	 it	 is	 likely	easier	 to	make	a	determination	as	to	
their	value.	Second,	the	application	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	will	eliminate	
many	patents	held	by	individuals	as	“tollbooths”	on	the	road	to	development.	To	
serve	effectively	as	a	tollbooth,	patents	must	be	broad,	vague,	and	general	so	as	
to	cast	as	wide	a	net	as	possible.	These	patents	will	likely	be	invalidated	through	
the	application	of	a	 strict	utility	 requirement.	Having	 reduced	 the	 incentive	 to	
hold	pioneering	patents,	patentees	may	be	more	inclined	to	enter	into	informal	
licensing	agreements.	
7.1.3.	US	Courts	are	Likely	to	Adopt	a	Strict	Utility	Requirement	when	Faced		
with	a	Nanotechnology	Patent	Application
The	issue	of	the	strength	of	the	utility	requirement	in	nanotechnology	inventions	
has	 not	 yet	 been	 examined	 by	 a	 US	 court.	 This	 issue	 is	 likely	 to	 arise	 in	 the	
near	 future,	as	products	made	using	nanomaterials	become	profitable	enough	
to	 trigger	 expensive	 patent	 litigation.	 When	 faced	 with	 a	 utility	 issue	 in	 a	
nanotechnology	patent	application,	courts	will	in	all	likelihood	adopt	a	strict	utility	
requirement	over	a	weak	utility	requirement.	First,	as	compared	to	1995,	when	
Brana	was	 decided	 and	 the	 1995	USPTO	Utility	 Examination	Guidelines	 were	
released,	precedent	now	points	 in	 the	direction	of	 a	 strict	 utility	 requirement.	
The	controlling	US	Supreme	Court	case,	 the	most	 recent	CAFC	case,	and	 the	
most	 recent	 USPTO	 Utility	 Examination	 Guidelines	 all	 adopt	 a	 strict	 utility	
requirement.271	As	well,	Fisher	demonstrates	that	the	CAFC,	a	court	which	has	
traditionally	expanded	rather	than	contracted	patent	rights,	is	ready	to	follow	the	
US	Supreme	Court	and	apply	a	heightened	utility	requirement.	Fisher	 reverses	
the	trend	of	permitting	patenting	at	an	earlier	phase	in	the	research	process.	
Second,	 since	 the	 late	1990s,	 skepticism	has	been	growing	 regarding	
the	 ability	of	basic	 research	patents	 to	 lead	 to	 the	efficient	development	 and	
commercialization	of	research.	This	skepticism	is	demonstrated	in	anticommons	
theory,	in	the	passage	of	the	2001	USPTO	Utility	Examination	Guidelines,	and	the	
CAFC’s	decision	in	Fisher.	Though	the	CAFC	explicitly	disavowed	contemporary	
policy	 concerns	 in	 Fisher,	 it	 implicitly	 recognized	 them	 and	 reacted	 to	 them	
through	references	from	Brenner.	In	Brenner,	Justice	Fortas	was	concerned	that	
giving	a	patentee	broad	control	over	an	unknowable	area	will	lead	to	slowdowns	
in	innovation.	This	concern	is	similar	to	the	anticommons	theorists’	concern	that	
excessive	transaction	costs	will	render	individuals	unable	to	assemble	fragmented	
and	 overlapping	 patents	 into	 a	 single	 usable	 bundle,	 thus	 causing	 a	 broad,	
unknowable	area	of	scientific	research	to	remain	inaccessible	to	future	innovators.	
It	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	CAFC,	after	 adopting	a	 strict	utility	 requirement	
for	ESTs,	will	adopt	a	weak	utility	requirement	for	nanotechnology	inventions.	A	
27�� Brenner,�supra�note�94;�Fisher,�supra note�203; USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233��
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weak	utility	requirement	presents	an	overly	optimistic	view	of	the	ability	of	broad	
patents	 on	 basic	 scientific	 research	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 efficient	 development	 and	
commercialization	of	 research.	A	 strict	utility	 requirement	achieves	a	workable	
balance	 between	 providing	 support	 and	 incentives	 for	 companies	 to	 invest	
resources	in	the	development	of	basic	research	while	ensuring	that	the	building	
blocks	of	scientific	research	remain	accessible	to	future	innovators.	The	adoption	
of	a	strict	utility	requirement	will	play	a	positive	role	in	overcoming	the	tragedy	of	
the	anticommons	in	nanotechnology.	
	
*
8. CONCLUSION 
nanoTEchnology has bEEn hEraldEd	as	the	next	transformative	technology,	a	
USA$1	 trillion	 industry	 that	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 prolong	 life	 and	 end	 world	
hunger,	 among	 other	 spectacular	 possibilities.272	 Over	 the	 last	 few	 decades,	
scientists	and	their	research	partners	have	acquired	nanotechnology	patents	in	a	
manner	 resembling	 a	 “gold	 rush.”273	 The	 nanotechnology	 gold	 rush	 has	
specifically	targeted	nanomaterials,	nanotechnology’s	building	blocks.274	Many	of	
the	patents	that	have	been	granted	for	nanomaterials	are	broad,	general	patents	
encompassing	basic	research.	
Nanotechnology	is	the	first	modern	technology	to	have	its	basic	research	
patented.275	Basic	research	in	most	other	technologies	in	the	twentieth	century	
remained	in	the	public	domain.276	A	driving	force	behind	the	patenting	of	basic	
research	in	nanotechnology	was	the	development-oriented	approach	to	patent	
rights.	This	approach	emerged	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.	Development-oriented	
theorists	 argued	 that	 the	most	 efficient	way	 to	 achieve	 the	development	 and	
commercialization	of	 research	 is	 to	grant	broad	patents	on	research	prospects	
shortly	 after	 their	 discovery.	 Development-oriented	 arguments	 supported	 the	
widespread	patenting	of	basic	research	in	the	1980s	and	1990s.277
Beginning	in	1998	with	the	publication	of	Heller’s	“The	Tragedy	of	the	
Anticommons,”	 proponents	 of	 “anticommons	 theory”	 challenged	 the	 claims	
of	 development-oriented	 theorists	 that	 the	 broad	 patenting	 of	 basic	 research	
necessarily	 leads	 to	 the	 efficient	 development	 and	 commercialization	 of	
research.278	Anticommons	theorists	argued	that	this	assumption	fails	to	take	into	
account	the	possibility	that	granting	broad	patents	on	research	prospects	could	
stifle	development	through	the	phenomenon	of	the	tragedy	of	the	anticommons.	
This	article	has	examined	the	US	nanotechnology	patent	 landscape	 in	
272�� Dal,�“From�Conventional�Technology�to�Carbon�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�2�at�p��3;�Schummer�and�
Baird,�Nanotechnology Challenges, supra note�2�at�p��;��Hall,�Nanofuture, supra note�2;�MacLurcan,�
“Nanotechnology�and�Developing�Countries,”�supra�note�5�at�p��2;�UNCTAD,�“Interactive�Dialogue�on�
Harnessing�Emerging�Technologies,”�supra�note�5;�Salamanca-Buentello�et al.,�“Nanotechnology�and�the�
Developing�World,”�supra�note�5;�RNCOS,�The World Nanotechnology Market,�supra�note�4�
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Superstructures, supra note�9�at�preface;�Ventra,�Evoy�and�Heflin�Jr�,�Introduction to Nanoscale Science and 
Technology,�supra note��at�p��2;��Miller�et al.,�The Handbook of Nanotechnology,�supra note�9�at�p��5��
275�� Lemley,�“Patenting�Nanotechnology,”�supra note�0�at�p��605�
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277�� Rai,�“Regulating�Scientific�Research,”�supra note�2�
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order	to	determine	whether	the	broad	patenting	of	basic	research	in	nanomaterials	
has	 stifled	 development	 in	 nanotechnology	 through	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anticommons.	 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 nanotechnology	 patent	
landscape	 suggests	 that	 the	 nanotechnology	 “gold	 rush”	 has	 created	 an	
anticommons	in	nanomaterials.	Patents	in	nanomaterials	are	broad,	overlapping,	
and	fragmented.279	Before	a	person	can	use	a	nanomaterial,	they	must	first	secure	
licenses	 to	 all	 of	 the	 exclusionary	 rights.	 If	 they	 cannot,	 the	 resource	 will	 go	
underused	and	innovation	will	suffer.	In	short,	the	anticommons	will	turn	tragic.
There	are	two	main	ways	to	prevent	the	nanotechnology	anticommons	
from	 becoming	 tragic.	 The	 first	 is	 through	 informal	 market	 mechanisms.	 As	
demonstrated	above,	transaction	costs	and	strategic	behaviour	will	likely	prove	to	
be	substantial	impediments	to	the	achievement	of	informal	licensing	agreements	
in	nanotechnology.	The	second	way	to	prevent	the	anticommons	from	becoming	
tragic	 is	 through	non-market	 solutions.	This	article	has	canvassed	various	non-
market	 solutions.	 I	 have	 proposed	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 strict	 utility	 requirement	
as	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problems	 posed	 by	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anticommons	 in	
nanotechnology	in	the	US.	
The	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	for	nanotechnology	inventions	
will	shift	patents	away	from	basic	research	in	nanomaterials	towards	the	practical	
application	of	nanomaterials.	As	a	result,	a	substantial	number	of	broad,	general	
patents	 encompassing	 basic	 research	 in	 nanotechnology	 will	 be	 invalidated,	
weakening	the	anticommons	and	reducing	transaction	and	strategic	costs.	 It	 is	
likely	that	US	courts,	when	confronted	with	the	question	of	the	proper	strength	
of	the	utility	requirement	in	nanotechnology	inventions,	will	adopt	a	strict	utility	
requirement	in	line	with	Brenner,	the	2001	USPTO	Utility	Examination	Guidelines,	
and	Fisher.280
The	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement,	however,	is	not	a	complete	
solution	 to	 the	 problems	 posed	 by	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anticommons	 in	
nanotechnology.	 In	 all	 probability,	 many	 patents	 on	 nanomaterials	 will	 satisfy	
the	 elevated	 utility	 requirement	 while	 still	 having	 sufficient	 breadth	 to	 be	
considered	part	of	the	nanotechnology	anticommons.	Transaction	and	strategic	
costs	associated	with	licensing	these	patents	may	prevent	users	from	bundling	
the	 remaining	 exclusionary	 rights	 in	 the	 nanotechnology	 anticommons.	 Thus,	
although	the	adoption	of	a	strict	utility	requirement	will	weaken	the	anticommons,	
innovation	may	still	be	stifled.	
If	 licensing	 difficulties	 cause	 significant	 damage	 to	 the	 nascent	 US	
nanotechnology	 industry	 after	 adoption	 of	 the	 strict	 utility	 requirement,	
Congress	must	take	its	cue	from	the	CAFC	in	Fisher	and	take	further	action	to	
address	the	problem	of	the	tragedy	of	the	anticommons	in	nanotechnology.	In	
seeking	to	provide	a	complete	solution	to	the	problems	posed	by	the	tragedy	
of	 the	 anticommons	 in	 nanotechnology,	 Congress	 should	 create	 government-
sponsored	 patent	 pools	 for	 nanomaterials.	 The	 creation	 of	 government-
sponsored	patent	pools	for	nanomaterials	will	ensure	that	nanomaterials	can	be	
used	in	downstream	implementations.	It	will	also	reward	those	researchers	who	
originally	discovered	and	developed	basic	research	in	nanomaterials.	Difficulties	
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280�� Brenner,�supra note�94;�Fisher,�supra note�203; USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 2001,�supra note�233��
114  university of ottawa	law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
with	respect	to	patent	valuation,	patent	validity,	and	the	scope	of	patent	pools	
must	be	addressed	before	government-created	patent	pools	can	act	as	a	solution	
to	the	problems	posed	by	the	nanotechnology	anticommons.	Furthermore,	given	
the	disruptive	effects	that	the	creation	of	a	government-sponsored	patent	pool	
will	 have	 on	 investment	 and	 capital,	 Congress	 should	 create	 patent	 pools	 for	
nanomaterials	only	after	it	is	satisfied	that	licensing	difficulties	are	causing	harm	
to	the	nanotechnology	industry.
Nanotechnology	has	been	said	to	have	the	potential	to	help	attain	the	
Millennium	Development	Goals,	to	bring	everlasting	life,	to	reverse	the	trends	of	
global	warming,	to	eliminate	disease	and	poverty,	and	to	build	a	utopian	world	
one	atom	at	a	time.	Whether	nanotechnology	will	accomplish	any	of	these	goals,	
or	whether	it	is	all	merely	science	fiction,	is	a	matter	for	debate.	Unless	action	is	
taken	to	eliminate	the	nanotechnology	anticommons,	however,	transaction	and	
strategic	costs	may	stifle	nanotechnology’s	 incredible	potential.	This	would	be	
truly	tragic.
